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Chapter 1: Introduction
Cross-border governance on the U.S.-Mexico border is dynamic, conflictive, complex,
and paradoxical given that several issues such as securitization, immigration, arms and drug
trafficking, and wealth and income disparities confluence there. At the same time, these issues
separate two border populations which continually flow back and forth as trade in goods and
services, investment and labor. The border is further complicated by a population that has a
unique border identity with historical, cultural and social processes, separated by two very
different governmental systems, which at times work at odds in their policy priorities. The U.S.Mexico border is therefore in need of a “comprehensive and accessible yet careful and evidencedriven analysis for policymakers and citizens alike” (Wilson and Lee 2013:4). All this makes it
imperative to comprehend the structure of cross-border governance in the Paso del Norte region,
one of the largest metropolitan area on the U.S.-Mexico border, in order to leverage its
advantages for the welfare of its citizens and to neutralize its disadvantages. This must be
accomplished by analyzing the factors that lead to stability and change, achievements and
shortcomings, and to give a place to border voices, therein yielding a better understanding of
governance mechanisms, actors, and institutions that constantly shape cross-border interaction
and policy outcomes. Such is the task of this work.
This thesis examines the factors and actors that interact and influence cross-border
governance in the Paso del Norte region. The goal is twofold. First, it seeks to explore the
challenges and developments in cross-border governance, identifying the crises and actors that
impact border interaction. Secondly, it uses semi-structured interviews of key cross-border
governance informants in the Paso del Norte region that stems from a larger study on the
transformations of cross-border governance in North America and Europe. Using interviews
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from El Paso and Ciudad Juárez, I structure this research under the strategic action field theory
proposed by Fligstein and McAdam (2012), Martínez’s (1994a) borderland milieu and Payan’s
(2010) typology of the terms coordination, cooperation, and collaboration. In this thesis, the field
of research is the Paso del Norte region, focusing on business and government officials. The
sample for this study is 34 individuals, which includes 26 face-to-face interviews with key crossborder governance stakeholders in the business/economic sector and political/security sectori, 4
El Paso Inc. Q&A (in-depth interviews), and 4 conference/speeches attended by the researcher.
The metropolitan region known as Paso del Norte is located in the middle of the 2,000
mile long U.S.-Mexico border, with a population of over two million people. It is one of the
largest international cross-border regions in the world (OECD 2010). The region consists of the
City of El Paso in West Texas, Sunland Park and Las Cruces in New Mexico, and Ciudad Juárez
in the northern State of Chihuahua, Mexico. However, the focus of this research will be
specifically between the two border cities, often referred to as ‘sister cities’ or ‘twin cities’ of El
Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua.
The two border communities share rich historical, cultural, social and economic bonds.
Separated by an international border boundary and two divergent governmental systems and
structures, the two cities share a complex challenge in designing and implementing public
policies, binational collaborative action, and facilitating interaction with actors across and along
the borderline. Despite how melded border communities may appear at first sight, components of
territory, authority, and rights (TAR) of each nation-state (Sassen 2008, as cited in Payan 2010)
and their sometimes conflicting interests determines what can be accomplished on the border,
which can act as one of the greatest obstacles for cross-border governance (Payan 2010:220). By
analyzing the mechanisms, power influence of actors and factors that shape border management
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and interaction, the Paso del Norte region can pinpoint whether cross-border governance is
failing, why, and what can be done in order to improve its functionality.
The introductory chapter is divided into eight main sections: (1) statement of the
problem, (2) purpose of the study, (3) theoretical framework, (4) hypotheses, (5) research
questions, (6) methodology, (7) significance of the study, and (8) organization of the thesis.

1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Scholars describe governance as many things, such as a weasel word, field, approach,
theory or perspective, but it remains an important concept because it “carries images and
meanings of change” (Levi-Faur 2012:7). For this research, governance will refer to all process
of governing, “whether undertaken by a government, market, or network, whether over a family,
tribe, formal or informal organization or territory, and whether through laws, norms, power, or
language” (Bevir 2012:1). As such, cross-border governance, will also abide by that definition,
just expanding it to include two or more governmental systems interacting at a borderline.
Who are the actors that govern the Paso del Norte region? (Coronado 1998). Who are the
actors that understand cross-border governance in the region? Who or what hinders its
development? The complexity behind cross-border governance, its trends, layers, and
development is a subject that is still poorly understood. Since the border is a dynamic area,
subject to both external and internal shocks (positive and negative); challenges, obstacles,
policies, and resolutions stem from different actors and governmental levels-binational, national,
state, and/or local. Moreover, the problem that arises in the Paso del Norte region is “governing
the region, as a region” (Office of the Texas Comptroller 1998), specifically where “binational
problems require binational solutions” (Staudt and Coronado 2002).

Furthermore, border

security involves the “public safety of border populations, rule of law in the region, security of
3

international human, trade, and investment flows, the national security considerations of each
country; and the collaboration between the national security interests of each” (Bronk and
González-Aréchiga 2011:155-156). Thus, collaboration is imperative in order to produce
sustainable responses and policy in order for the border to thrive.
Several challenges affect cross-border governance on the U.S.-Mexico border. Among
them are cultural, political, legal and administrative barriers; as well as differences in public
policy priorities, institutional mechanisms and accountability measures, socio-economic
inequalities, economic and trade issues, limited resources, environmental issues, immigration
policies and security dilemmas occurring across and within jurisdictional lines (see Payan 2013,
Anderson and Gerber 2008; Brunet-Jailly 2007; Payan 2006; Homedes and Ugalde 2003; Staudt
and Coronado 2002). Moreover, major events have an impact in restructuring border policy and
issues. For example, the attacks on September 11, 2001 (also referred to as 9/11) in New York
and Washington D.C initiated a deeper national security rationale, with the U.S-Mexico border
perhaps being the area that was most affected as a result (Payan 2006:13). Despite the immense
geographic distance between the sites of the terrorist attacks and the U.S.-Mexico border,
heightened securitization and militarization on the border area impacted lives of cross-border
communities. Ultimately, border residents are left to “adjust, adapt, and react to Washington’s
decisions” (Payan 2006:5). Analyzing this problem is central to this thesis research. The public
policies and decisions that are made in the two nations’ capitals, Washington D.C and Mexico
City, affect cross-border communities, magnify the frustration and create misunderstandings that
border voices convey in the interviews analyzed in this research. Figure 1.1 depicts the
geographic distance of the Paso del Norte region from its nation’s capitals, 1,700 miles
southwest of Washington D.C and 970 miles northwest of Mexico City (OECD 2010:1-2).
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Figure 1.1: Geographical Proximity to Nation’s Capitals
Source: OECD 2010:2

1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This research stems from a larger project that aims to provide a comparative investigation
on the dynamics of cross-border governance in North America and Europe. This thesis focuses
on the Paso del Norte component of this much larger project. In order to explain the purpose of
this study, a description of the research project is presented, as the data used in this thesis
branches from the data collected and gathered for the international project.
In 2012, a team of North American and European researchers began working on a
project, funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC)
entitled “The Transformations of Cross-Border Governance: North America and Europe in a
Comparative Perspective.” The research team consists of investigators, collaborators and
graduate students (See Bordergov Network 2012). The four core researchers- Dr. Bruno
5

Dupeyron, principal investigator (University of Regina, Canada), Dr. Eduardo Mendoza (Colegio
de la Frontera Norte, Mexico), Dr. Francesc Morataii (Autonomous University of Barcelona,
Spain), and Dr. Tony Payan (University of Texas at El Paso, USA). Additionally, there are ten
research collaborators, and from the Paso del Norte region include Dr. Kathleen Staudt from the
University of Texas at El Paso, and Dr. Consuelo Pequeño Rodríguez and Dr. Martha Patricia
Barraza de Anda from the Autonomous University of Ciudad Juárez (UACJ). As a graduate
student at the University of Texas at El Paso, I applied and accepted the position of research
assistant, under the supervision of Dr. Tony Payan. The research objectives include involving the
graduate research assistants recruited for this project to be deeply involved in at all stages of the
research

including

qualitative

data

analysis,

conducting

semi-structured

interviews,

implementing a web-based survey, fieldwork, and presenting findings at conferences. Moreover,
the ethics application submitted by the principal investigator acknowledges that the data
collected will serve several purposes, including graduate research students’ thesis projects
(Dupeyron 2012a).
The research intends to fill the gap in border studies about the transformations of North
American and European cross-border governance “not as a static phenomenon but as a
transforming one” (Dupeyron 2012b). Eight initial cross-border regions were identified (see
Figure 1.2). In North America, (1) Cascadia, (2) Quebec-U.S North-East regions on the U.SCanada border; as well as (3) San Diego-Tijuana, (4) El Paso-Ciudad Juárez on the U.S-Mexico
border. In Europe, the cross-border regions would be: (5) Galicia- Portugal Euroregion (SpainPortugal), (6) Pyrenees Euroregion (France-Spain), (7) Rhineland Valley (France-GermanySwitzerland) and (8) Euregio (Germany-the Netherlands)iii.
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Figure 1.2: Initial Case Studies Selected in North America and Europe
Source: Bruno 2012b

1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Similar to the international project, I will use the ‘theory of fields’ proposed by Fligstein
and McAdam (2012) as a theoretical lens to examine actors’ perspectives of power structure,
mechanisms, opportunities, failures, and insights on the dynamics of security governance in our
region. The authors argue that the field framework can be applied in a number of settings and
disciplines, because it does not consider the context, such social, cultural or historical, in which
strategic action occurs, so it is up to the researcher and the field under question to interpret the
context. Moreover, applying strategic action field theory to border studies is relatively new, so it
can be examined in many ways and across multiple fields. The aim of this research is to structure
the theory to relate to the border, and address what the authors did not account for in this general
theory, such as the overlap between state fields, as it is the case with the U.S.-Mexico border.
Thus, I incorporate two additional theories, borderland milieu by Martínez (1994) and border
typology by Payan (2010) to complement the field theory.
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While the theoretical framework will be explained further in a subsequent chapter, since
this thesis draws heavily from this theory, it is important to outline its basic elements. Fligstein
and McAdam develop a theory that intends to help explain “how stability and change are
achieved by social actors in circumscribed social arenas” (2012:3). The authors identify seven
central elements to their theory:
1. Strategic action fields
2. Incumbents, challengers, and governance units
3. Social skill and the existential functions of the social
4. The broader field environment
5. Exogenous shocks, mobilization, and the onset of contention
6. Episodes of contention
7. Settlement

1.3.1 Strategic Action Fields
Fligstein and McAdam (2012:9) argue that a strategic action field, also referred to as a SAF, is a:
“mesolevel social order in which actors (who can be individual or collective) are attuned
to and interact with one another on the basis of shared (which is not to say consensual)
understandings about the purpose of the field, relationships to others in the field
(including who has power and why), and the rules governing legitimate action in the
field.”
Fields can experience times of stability, contention, and change. However, even in times of
stability, actors can learn how to accept the status quo, yet still look for ways to gain advantage
and improve their position in the field. It is important to note, however, that a stable field is
achieved either by the ordered power by a dominant group or the creation of a cooperative
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political coalition between groups (14). During times of contention and change, new fields can
emerge and existing fields can transform, while setting new rules, actors, and power structure.

1.3.2 Incumbents, Challengers, and Governance Units
All collective actors’ state or non-state, such as organizations, governmental systems, or
NGOs, can make up strategic action fields. The authors argue that actors have a contentious
nature, causing actors to make moves, and other actors to interpret, rationalize and respond
(Fligstein and McAdam 2012:12). These actors are classified as incumbents, challengers, and
governance units, and their structure depends on the nature of the SAF (15). Incumbents are
those actors who “wield disproportionate influence within a field and whose interests and views
tend to be heavily reflected in the dominant organization of the strategic action field” (13). On
the other hand, challengers are those within a field who have less influence and power, usually
conforming to the status quo, yet remaining vigilant on new opportunities to improve their
position and “challenge the structure and logic of the system” (13). Moreover, actors known as
governance units are those that are “charged with overseeing compliance with field rules and, in
general, facilitating the overall smooth functioning and reproduction of the system” (14).
However, Fligstein and McAdam argue that most governance units are influenced heavily by
incumbents, and are usually not unbiased mediators, rather they are actors who reinforce the
“dominant perspective and guard the interests of the incumbents” (14).

1.3.3 Social Skill and the Existential Functions of the Social
This particular element of the theory of fields states that social skills are the “capacity for
intersubjective thought and action that shapes the provision of meaning, interests, and identity in
the service of collective ends” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012:4). Socially skilled actors help
9

shape, and ideally mobilize collective action. Appealing to what Fligstein and McAdam term the
‘existential functions of the social’, “a collaborative product, born of the everyday reciprocal
meaning making, identity conferring efforts we engage in with those around us” (42), which can
help socially skilled actors can appeal to grounded cooperation between incumbents and
challengers and thus achieve field stability.

1.3.4 The Broader Field Environment
Fligstein and McAdam state how strategic action fields can be embedded into other
fields’, also known as the broader field environment, consisting of three sets of binary
distinctions- distant and proximate fields, dependent and interdependent fields, and state and
non-state fields. Proximate fields are those with constant ties and whose actions affect the field;
while distant fields are not likely to have strong ties and hold little influence over the change and
position of the field. Dependent and interdependent fields are those that reflect the level of
influence over the field. Finally, there is the distinction of state and non-state fields, and the
authors explain how they see state fields as interdependent fields, which can also have a
horizontal or vertical relationship (18-19).

1.3.5 Exogenous Shocks, Mobilization, and the Onset of Contention
Fligstein and McAdam explain changes in strategic action fields much like throwing a
stone in a motionless pond, sending ripples and affecting proximate fields (19). Depending on
the change, the ripple effect can pose new threats to the stability of the fields, opening up new
opportunities or challenges for both incumbents and challengers. Furthermore, in order for a field
to experience an onset of contention, the authors explain that those actors who evaluate the threat
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or opportunity require organizational resources to mobilize and act, and there will be an increase
in interaction between actors in the SAF using unprecedented forms of action (21).

1.3.6 Episodes of contention
When a SAF reaches an episode of contention, it will be a period of “emergent, sustained
contentious interaction between… [field] actors utilizing new and innovative forms of action visà-vis one another” (McAdam 2007:253 as cited in Fligstein and McAdam 2012:21). It is also
characterized by quandary or crisis regarding the order and power of actors in the SAF in
question. Generally during episodes of contention, Fligstein and McAdam point out that framing
is expected to occur, with actors seeking to mobilize consensus. This is important to note
because existential and instrumental considerations are at play as all actors “have a stake in
restoring the shared sense of order and existential integrity on which social life ultimately rests”
(22).

1.3.7 Settlement
A settlement in a SAF can happen either through oppositional mobilization or reversion
to the status quo. Thus, a field may experience “new or refurbished institutional settlement
regarding field rules and cultural norms” (22). Again there is an understanding and conformance
on the field and positions. Fligstein and McAdam (92) also note that even in the most stable field
or when a settlement has been reached, it should always “be regarded as a work in progress”.

1.3.8 Why Field Theory?
Fligstein and McAdam’s theory of fields focuses on meso-level social orders aiming to
understand the dynamics of change and stability by actors in defined spaces. Moreover, their
theory reflects and expands from organizational, institutional, and social movement theories, as
11

well as several scholars including Bourdieu and Giddens. Their theory can be examined with an
interdisciplinary perspective and within a variety of social, economic, historical and political
situations. However, Fligstein and McAdam point out that while the idea of fields has been
around for over four decades, “little progress has been made in systemizing what we mean by
fields, how we study them, and how we understand and interrogate the contexts in which they
appear” (198). Thus, the border is an ideal place to research field dynamics and phenomena,
because it brings a deeper understanding of incumbents, challengers, power structure, crises and
large scale phenomena, mechanisms of change, and transformations in field governance.
It is also important to examine the limitations of field theory, particularly in accounting
for border related phenomena. In addition to the overlap and dominance of state fields, perhaps
one of the biggest gaps in the theory is in the challenger-incumbent model, which does not
consider the ‘invisible’ or voiceless challengers within a field. For example, Staudt and Cruz
(2014), using the theoretical framework of field theory, find that in the Paso del Norte region
there are “muted and less visible voices” among them the maquiladora export processing
workers and taxpayers. This brings into question the challenger-incumbent model, where the
classification of actors is not as clear-cut as Fligstein and McAdam propose. Furthermore, the
theory of fields undervalues the latent role of rhetoric, discourse or narrative to actions between
actors during times of animosity. However, despite its limitations, field theory provides a unique
direction and insight on the dynamics and power of players and how events and actors change or
transform the field in question. Moreover, two additional theories, borderland milieu by Martínez
(1994) and border typology by Payan (2010) together provide a more thorough direction and
examination of field governance in the Paso del Norte region.

12

The field examined in this thesis is the Paso del Norte region, and by using the theory
proposed by Fligstein and McAdam (2012), the seven central elements will suggest a number of
research questions and hypotheses about actors that interact in the field, and crises and
exogenous shocks that change and transform the border area. Scholars in Political Science and
other disciplines have suggested the opportunities presented to incumbents and challengers and
the crises that work for and against them, but this research shows it systematically and offers the
field theoretical framework to explain how this happens. Moreover, social skills will be assessed
in the analysis of in-depth interviews who shared their experiences working in key cross-border
governance positions. This research aims to contribute to existing field research and
understanding of border dynamics.
I argue that at times, actors, such as the state, are not the same; where one state is likely
to carry more power than the other in policy and norm making. This asymmetrical power, along
with the possession of human, financial, technical resources makes federal policy makers in the
nation’s capitals more likely to be viewed as incumbents. Thus, incumbents enforce a set of
‘rules’ (ones here we see as security priorities) to a strategic action field to which they perceive
threats differently from challengers. Incumbents are likely to enforce these ‘rules’ that are shaped
by their perception of the strategic action field (Paso del Norte) but do not understand the
“shared understandings” already created, as seen in our interviews in a later chapter, who
sometimes have different interests, values and norms in mind, and bonded to their identity
(fronterizos). However, the clash between the incumbents and the challengers has begun an
attempt to transform the ‘rules’ of the game, in the works by key strategic skilled actors who
attempt to educate ‘incumbents’ (i.e. policymakers in capitals) to see the border as a place of
opportunity not minacity.
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1.4 HYPOTHESES
Following the conceptual framework and central elements by Fligstein and McAdam (2012),
the hypothetical expectations in this research are:
1. Incumbent actors are more likely to have historically formalized/institutionalized shared
understandings that shape and influence the field.
2. Challengers are more likely to forge coalitions to increase cooperation and opportunities.
3. Governance units are likely to enforce incumbent interests and oversee the management
of the field.
4. Exogenous shocks/crises allow actors opportunities to determine, change, or transform
rules in a particular field.
5. Border identity (similar to existential functions) of the challengers will determine how
challengers view who ‘gets’ the border region.
6. Socially skilled actors are more likely to form alliances and attempt to educate
incumbents on the field in question.

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The major research questions in this study are:
1. Who are the incumbents, challengers, governance units that interact on the border?
2. What types of social skills are evident in the Paso del Norte region?
3. Who are the skilled social actors (institutional entrepreneurs) who challenge, innovate,
advocate, change, or/and help stabilize a field?
4. What mix of exogenous shocks, field ruptures and contentions have occurred and
changed cross-border governance dynamics?
5. How have actors reacted to episodes of contention and settlement?
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6. How do actors that operate across the borderline create, recreate, and navigate the norms
and institutions that in turn give shape to their interactions?
7. How can actors move towards a settlement in strategic action fields and cross-border
governance in the Paso del Norte region?

1.6 METHODOLOGY
The international research project uses a mixed methodological approach involving text
analyses of scholarly and government documents and publications; semi-structured interviews of
key cross-border informants; and a web-based survey in order to evaluate and compare each case
study. As part of the qualitative aspect of the study, the El Paso-Ciudad Juárez team designed the
interview guide used in the semi-structured interviews. The guide consists of 61 questions,
ranging from personal information, border experience/exposure, professional position, crossborder networks, challenges and obstacles, cross-border sociability and reflections and
recommendations (see Appendix A). Additionally, as per university protocol for human subjects,
I submitted an Institutional Review Board (IRB) project at the University of Texas at El Paso on
April 26, 2013, and received IRB approval. Furthermore, in April 2014, before the IRB
expiration date, I submitted a Continuing Review/Progress Report. The IRB reference number is
431390-3, and it was classified as an Expedited Review based on the applicable federal
regulations. The IRB expiration date of this project is May 1, 2015 (See Appendix B).
Moreover, it is important to note that international travel policy at the University of
Texas at El Paso is determined by the travel warnings issued by the U.S. Department of State,
and applicable to all university faculty, staff and students. If there is a travel warning (as is the
case with Mexico, specifically the state of Chihuahua and Ciudad Juárez) then per university
regulations, travel is suspended, unless an exception is made by the International Oversight
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Committee. Ergo, conducting cross-border research is challenging, but taking into account this
obstacle, our research team partnered with the Autonomous University of Ciudad Juárez (UACJ)
to collaborate with the research project and help us conduct interviews. Thus, this research could
not have been possible without UACJ research assistants, Héctor Gómez and Alejandra Payan,
who conducted the interviews in Ciudad Juárez. In the El Paso and Ciudad Juárez area, the indepth semi-structured interviews conducted totaled to 71 interviews; 34 conducted in Ciudad
Juárez and 37 in El Paso, respectively. The key actors interviewed worked in the sectors of
business, health, education, water/natural resources, politics, security and civil society.
The purpose of this international study is to improve our understanding of the
complexities of cross-border governance in the region but also to compare several regions as
each handles unique sets of problems with unique tools in order to achieve higher degrees of
effectiveness in cross-border governance. However, this thesis will focus on the Paso del Norte
region, first involving analysis of participant observation in conferences, field notes, an
analytical review of the literature, and governmental documents and publications. Through
participant observation, I have audio recorded data of these conferences and field notes of the
meetings. I also collected printed materials, including brochures and reports. These varied data
sources will allow triangulate analysis and interpretation and therefore increase the reliability and
validity of findings (Hales 2010: 18).
This qualitative study involves 26 face-to-face semi-structured interviews of key crossborder informants, 4 El Paso Inc. Q&A (in-depth interviews), and 4 conference/speeches. The
informants selected for this thesis include individuals from the business and political/security
field, as to show variability within the theoretical framework that will consider actors that
interact in the region- incumbents, challengers, and governance units. I specifically focus on the
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security paradigm because the heightened securitization and militarization on the U.S-Mexico
border is a continuing palpable phenomenon that affects all factors of life at the border. It is
important to note that the international study aims to provide an examination of cross-border
governance as a transforming phenomenon. However, this thesis focuses on the qualitative field
work and narratives of key stakeholders, often describing their experiences during their time
working in a cross-border environment, thus limiting this thesis to a certain point in time.
Therefore, while this research focuses on events that are relatively recent, there is a whole series
of historical forces (see Chapter Two) that brought us to the present and will continue to change
over time. Thus, I aim to provide a deeper understanding on field governance in the Paso del
Norte region and the actors, events, and policies that shape and transform interaction and action.

1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
As globalization trends increase, effective cross-border governance is increasingly
important in nearly any border context, and it is certainly significant in the study of integration
and collaboration between two regions in need of coordinating their policies to achieve both
security and prosperity. As such, this study sets the stage for further exploration of the factors
that impact cross-border governance, the actors that govern in the Paso del Norte region, and the
resources and opportunities available in the field. In addition, listening to key cross-border
governance informants and the way they experience cross-border governance can provide an indepth understanding of interaction among institutions and actors in our region, specifically the
challenges, obstacles, resolutions, and best practices they have come across. How the Paso del
Norte region is governed and by whom sheds knowledge on implications for action, policy
change, and incentivizing discussion on the current state of cross-border governance. To date,
there have been two other research papers using the framework of theory of fields to analyze the
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Paso del Norte region (see Staudt and Cruz 2014; Payan and Cruz 2014); therefore it is important
to continue the study of cross-border governance and carry out further meso-level theorization in
order to identify the incumbents, challengers, governance units and crises in order to better
understand the dynamics of cross-border governance in the region.

1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter, the introduction, provides an
overview of the problem, purpose of the study, theoretical framework, research questions
hypotheses, methodology and significance. The second chapter contains a literature review
consisting of a historical summarization of key events that changed the border, cross-border
governance in the Paso del Norte region, and gaps in research. The third chapter expounds the
theoretical framework using Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) theory of strategic action fields,
Martínez’s (1994) borderland milieu and Payan’s (2010) border typology among the terms
coordination, cooperation, and collaboration. The fourth chapter delineates the methodology,
data collection procedures, confidentiality of participants’, limitations, and analysis approach.
The fifth chapter presents identified categories and qualitative analysis. Finally, the sixth chapter
contains a recapitulation of the study and results, addresses limitations, provides a discussion for
future research, and proposes policy recommendations.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This chapter provides key literature that accounts for historical developments on the U.S.Mexico border, identifying key transformations and events, addresses reality vs. perception in
cross-border governance, identifies barriers for cross-border governance, and gaps in research.
Understanding the developments of the U.S.-Mexico border and cross-border governance from a
historical standpoint may help provide clarity in interviewees accounts on field formation, and
power structure.

2.1 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS ON THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER
Historically, the U.S.-Mexico border area has undergone vast changes and continues to
be dynamic given issues such as securitization, immigration, and economic interdependence.
Payan (2006:135) argues that while historically there have been periods of stability on the U.S.Mexico border, the general direction has been towards closure. There have been several events
that have set in motion such a direction, ones which we will explore through interviewees’
perspectives. However this chapter will explore additional factors for heightened security
measures on the U.S-Mexico border. The history of the border provides a view on how the
border has changed, how it is now, and conceivably how it might be in the future (Payan
2006:3). Additionally, in relation to the main theoretical framework by Fligstein and McAdam
(2012), border historical events show an insight on field emergence: how incumbents,
challengers, and governance units, and crises have shaped and defined the rules of the game on
U.S.-Mexico border.
The physical boundary between the two countries from the Rio Grande to the Gulf of
Mexico was formalized by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 ending the U.S.-Mexican
war. However, continued tensions between the two countries led to the Gadsden Purchase in
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1853, and what is now the Arizona/Sonora and Chihuahua/New Mexico border. Moreover, the
Chamizal dispute in El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua started a century long land
dispute due to violent floods which shifted territory and it was until the Chamizal Convention of
1963 that settled the border dispute.
Payan (2006) indicates the border has gone through four stages: the frontier era, customs
era, law enforcement era, and the national security border. The frontier era (1848 and 1910), was
one where the border was open, and both mobility and access were hardly restricted. Mexican
immigration was not priority; rather it was European and Chinese immigration that was a greater
concern at that time. The overall sentiment of the U.S government viewed immigrants as
workers, “not as potential criminals who posed problems of law enforcement or national
security” (7). Moreover, institutional history and agencies that were responsible for immigration
services perhaps reflect the shifting mood of immigration from an economic to a security issue;
starting from Treasury Department (1891), Department of Commerce and Labor (1903),
Department of Labor (1913), Department of Justice (1933-2003), to Department of Homeland
Security (2003-present).
However, the second border stage, the customs border era (1910-1970s) changed the
border dramatically. The first major event was the start of the Mexican Revolution in 1910,
which led the United States to monitor and set forts along the border to avoid spillover.
Secondly, the United States was beginning to see a growing anti-immigration sentiment due to
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 that had been extended. The third event was the prohibition
era from 1920-1933, which made the border a point of interest, as smuggling alcohol increased.
Although, prohibition also brought border cities tourism and some began to see an economic
advantage. For example, in 1923, the El Paso Chamber of Commerce began a publicity
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campaign in magazines and professional journals to potentially reach up to fifty million people in
the U.S in order to attract visitors and potential settlers (Martinez, 1996:153). Thus, border
inspections and enforcement due to smuggling and immigration laws was a concern to the U.S.
government, leading to the creation of the Border Patrol in 1924. Finally, Payan (2006) considers
that the customs era was changed through the First and Second World War, where the maturity
and power of the United States grew, thus showing the economic and political disparities from
Mexico, and perhaps making it an attractive opportunity for people to move to the United States,
both legally and illegally.
The third era, ‘law enforcement’ (1980-2001), revolved around two issues, the growing
undocumented migration and the growing drug trade by Colombian and Mexican cartels and
their alliances. Moreover, tougher law enforcement led to initiatives to deter unauthorized
immigration. Some of these operations included Operation Hold the Line in El Paso, Operation
Safeguard in Arizona, and Operation Gatekeeper in California (12). Customs and Border
Protection history describes Operation Hold the Line as one to “to bring a level of control to the
border…. proved an immediate success” (CBP n.d); however, these operations also resulted in
moving undocumented crossers from these areas to “dangerous and deadly terrain of the
mountains and deserts” (BNHR 2006:5). Moreover, in Operation Hold the Line, U.S. authorities
failed to consult their Mexican counterparts, leading the (then) mayor of Ciudad Juárez,
Francisco Villarreal to find out about the operation in the press (Bean, et al. 1994:5). The failure
to consult counterparts in cross-border regions has an impact in augmenting the norm of mistrust
of U.S. and Mexican officials that has been present for many years.
However, as the law enforcement era continued, economically, there was the
implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in January 1994,
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between Canada, Mexico and the United States, and had the goal of “removing barriers to trade
in the region” (Fullerton and Walke 2014:4). Moreover, while trade flows tripled from $81
billion in 1993 to $247 billion in 2000, Andreas (2003:4) explains how border enforcement did
not surmount legitimate border crossings, where border wait times for vehicles and pedestrians
were often “manageable and tolerable”.
The fourth and current border stage is the “national security border”. The event that
instigated the national security era was the terrorist attacks on the east coast on September 11,
2001. Although the 9/11 terrorists did not enter from Mexico and the attacks did not happen
anywhere near the U.S.-Mexico border, it was perhaps one of the areas that was most affected as
a result, as surveillance and inspection increased significantly and border issues were redefined
as national security matters (Payan 2006:13). In a quick and possibly panicked response, after the
terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C, the border was shutdown, leaving crossborder commuters separated from their jobs, school, families and friends. Furthermore, Anderson
and Gerber (2008:215) explain that after 9/11, the social, economic and other forces held in
check by border communities were removed, allowing U.S federal policy makers to “see the
border as little more than a security issue”. To an already closing border, this event was
consequential in the increasing militarization and securitization.
Heyman and Ackleson (2010) identify trends that date from pre-9/11 to 2005 to analyze
changes in border security, and describe two opportunities presented by September 11th, brand
new policy initiatives and to continue plans before 9/11, “but had not found particular traction in
the earlier political environment” (49). For example, the creation of a Homeland Security
Agency had been discussed before 9/11. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
(Hart-Rudman Commission) published its national security challenges Phase III Report in
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February 2001, recommending the creation of an independent Homeland Security Agency, with
the three organizations of border security, the Coast Guard, Customs Service and Border Patrol
transferred to it (USCN/21 2001). Following the recommendations, Representative Mac
Thornberry proposed a bill, H.R 1158, to create the agency, and while hearings were held, but
Congress did not enact it (Borja 2008:3). It wasn’t until eleven days after the September 11 th
terrorist attacks that President George W. Bush appointed Tom Ridge as the first Director of the
Office of Homeland Security, subsequently leading to the U.S Department of Homeland Security
formally created in November 2002 with the passage of the Homeland Security Act (DHS 2012).
Crises and opportunities go hand in hand as actors define the rules of the field in question.
The most recent crisis to broaden the national security era: Mexico’s war against drug
trafficking organizations (la guerra contra el narcotráfico), launched by President Felipe
Calderón in 2006. Coupled with Mexico’s corruption, police, weak judicial institutions, poverty,
and various socio-economic problems, the violence grew. While government and media data on
the death estimates due to the drug war vary, depending on the source, it is estimated 45,000 to
60,000 killings over the course of the Calderón administration (Molzahn, Rodríguez Ferreira,
and Shirk. 2013:14; Beittel 2013). To date, conservative estimates place the death toll over
70,000 lives, and with some estimates claiming over 100,000 (Correa-Cabrera and Garrett
2014:245). Among the hardest hit in the ‘war’ were border cities which are major trafficking
routes to the United States. As such, Ciudad Juárez would be the epicenter of the violence with
nearly 11,000 people killed (Eisenhammer 2013:100). The violence affected many sectors,
particularly businesses. The National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Instituto Nacional de
Estadística y Geografía [INEGI]) calculated that around 11,000 businesses closed due to the
violence (Payan 2011:128). Businesses suffered due to limited customers and as criminal activity
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rose, many businesses were subjected to extortion fee (la cuota), with the uncertainty that if the
price was not paid or refused, they could be kidnapped, have their business set on fire, robbed, or
killed. Additionally, the U.S State Department issued travel advisory and warnings for travel,
which deterred many potential visitors.

2.2 CROSS-BORDER GOVERNANCE: PERCEPTION VS. REALITY
Both the economic and security realms dominate the dynamics of interaction on the
U.S.-Mexico border. Andreas (2003:13) describes the policy priority oscillation between security
and economic issues, such as the 1960’s Cold War, where security dominated, 1970’s where
economic matters were at interest, 1980’s geopolitical tensions giving rise to security, 1990’s
where globalization was a popular theme, to the 21st century, where security is prominent once
again. Martinez (1994a) considers the U.S.-Mexico border as a strong example of asymmetrical
interdependence. For the most part, the United States has determined the fate of the border,
leaving border communities almost voiceless in decisions where national interests prevail over
local.
Moreover, when security issues clash with the economic interests, as in 9/11, it is easy to
see the imbalance, with almost 90 percent of Mexico’s trade going to the United States, and only
15 percent of U.S. exports going to Mexico, thus leaving Mexico far more susceptible to
disruptions (Andreas 2003). Another example of this can be seen in studies of the cost of border
wait times and congestion to U.S. and Mexican economies. The long wait times, a result of
heightened security and militarization on the border, results in millions of dollars of lost
economic growth (Wilson and Lee 2013). Yet incentives of profits and market forces drive and
motivate economic collaboration. Governments, ranging from local to federal, promote crossborder cooperation among businesses, enjoying facilitators that some other sectors do not enjoy,
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such as profits or subsidies (Staudt and Coronado 2002: 112). Thus, the economic sector has
incentives and resources that encourage collaboration. Similarly, border crossers are seen as
economic entities that consume and spend (Payan 2010:237), enhancing ties in cross-border
governance in our region. However, despite mutual interests, both in security and economic
issues, the state of border governance on the U.S-Mexico border has not developed into full
collaboration. O’Neil (2009:73) in turn, argues that in order to overcome Mexico’s security
challenges, the U.S. needs to move from a “short-term threat-based mentality” and more to one
that considers elements such as trade, economic development, and immigration.
However, in a security dominated field, Wæver (1995:54) argues that security problems
are always defined by the state and its elites, and “power holders can always try to use the
instrument of securitization of an issue to gain control over it.” Thus, power holders can take
advantage of crises to impose their power and dominance to level the field to their leverage.
Various events, such as 9/11 and Mexico’s war on drug trafficking have impacted border
security, but perhaps the discourse, rhetoric and most importantly, perceptions have also
changed, inevitably increasing misunderstanding to the U.S.-Mexico border. Ackleson (2005)
examines border security discourse in pre and post 9/11, identifying how issues can be
securitized partly through discourse, and arguing that societal and state security has become
increasingly merged. Furthermore, Correa-Cabrera and Garrett (2014) acknowledge border
security transformations and perceptions since 9/11, and examine the reinforcement of such
perceptions due to Mexico’s drug war and escalated violence. The authors argue that there is
‘rhetoric of fear’ in statements by politicians, Washington government officials, reports, media,
that depict “a situation of extreme violence on the US side of the border that does not necessarily
correspond to reality” (246).

25

In turn, the fear and threat security discourse that permeates the U.S.-Mexico border is
consequential to business and trade. Correa-Cabrera and Garrett (2014:249) comment on how
Mexico’s drug violence seems to be benefiting to U.S. border cities economically while in
Mexico, it worsens. Niño et al. (2013) quantitatively examine organized crime homicides in
Ciudad Juárez and economic conditions in El Paso, with results suggesting that a rise in
organized crime related homicides had an adverse effect on El Paso’s economy, by likely
“reducing complementary business activity in Juárez”, and a positive economic spillover as
individuals opted or relocated for “safer shopping venues north of the border.” Furthermore,
using interviews and speeches with business people, non-governmental organizations, and local
government officials in El Paso and Ciudad Juárez, Staudt and Cruz (2014) find that local actors
argue that policymakers in the U.S. and Mexico do not “get” the huge stakes in trade between the
two countries.

2.3 BARRIERS INTERFERING WITH SUSTAINABLE CROSS-BORDER GOVERNANCE
There are various complex factors that exacerbate misunderstanding on the U.S.-Mexico
border, and thus can affect governance. Among them can be political, administrative,
professional, legal, and cultural barriers, to which federal and state policymakers in the U.S. and
Mexico have not “given a high priority to the resolution or even to the understanding of these
barriers and their impact” (Homedes and Ugalde 2003). Additionally, a major obstacle to
governance is coordinating between two different governmental systems, further complicated by
“disparate entities, with dissimilar agendas, unequal powers, unalike interest and unalike
jurisdictions (See Payan 2010:235). Thus, the state of security issues is highly dependent on the
actors who collaborate.
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The security sector has an immense power influence, in capacity, agenda setting, and
influence that impacts all sectors and cross-border governance in the U.S.-Mexico border. Bronk
and González-Aréchiga (2011:157) state that the insecurity regarding collaboration lies in the
“cost-benefit assessment of agencies in terms of the risk of being infiltrated, diluted, or
compelled to adopt wasteful or gross ineffective strategies of collaboration.” Historically this can
be seen, such as in the mid-1980s through 1990s, where cooperation was hindered due to
problems such as U.S mistrust of Mexican counter drug officials, disagreement to U.S. drug
certification procedures and concerns about Mexican sovereignty (Seelke and Finklea 2014:5)
Furthermore, Benítez Manaut (2006:145) argues that while security issues in United States,
Mexico and Canada are interdependent, in Mexico there are sectors who resist cooperation
because they believe there is no reciprocity by Washington. As such, these factors that aggravate
the state of collaboration in security issues are norms that have been created over a historically
complicated region, challenging the likelihood of successful and sustainable implementation of
policies.
Moreover, the intensification of securitization at the border gave way to another obstacle
in border security, one that points to the blurred definition between national security and public
security, both being issues that the U.S and Mexico prioritize very differently. National security
refers “the threats coming from outside and which jeopardize the safety of the nation as a
whole,” while public security implies the “safety of the citizens from each other, e.g., criminal
activity by citizens on other citizens or their property (Payan 2006:124). In the wake of 9/11,
national security has been a top priority for the United States, and Mexico has had to abide by
the policy decisions and implementations at the border as a result.
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However, Payan (2006:125) argues that if public security was a priority of both nations,
such as in the case of drug trafficking, there could be an overlap in definitions, interests, and thus
increased cooperation (See Payan 2013). The opportunity for such a case came about in 2006,
when Mexican President Felipe Calderón declared war on narco-trafficking. Felipe Calderón
emphasized that the United States is the world’s largest consumer of drugs and largest supplier
of firearms, therefore there was a shared responsibility implied in helping Mexico during the
drug war. As a result, in 2007, the United States and Mexico announced the Mérida Initiative, to
aid Mexico in combatting drug trafficking. Initially, U.S. assistance focused on training and
equipment for Mexico, but as of March 2010, a new security framework was launched,
addressing Mexico’s “weak government institutions and underlying societal problems that have
allowed the drug trade to thrive” (Seelke and Finklea 2014:6). The Mérida Initiative has boosted
cooperation in terms of mutual interest by both nations; however, Ramos (2011:84) argues that
private sector had doubts in collaborating with governments of both nations, not only because of
the economic crisis, but rather security policies that affect their economic activities. Furthermore,
Anderson and Gerber (2008:216) explain that because national interests prevail over local needs,
border communities often do not have a “clear view of their own needs or are unable to express
them in a coherent and unified voice to policy makers in distant capitals.”

2.4 WHAT IS MISSING?
Much of the literature corresponds to the study of factors that impact border fields.
However research on the borderland is missing more emphasis on an important element that
needs to be studied, the formation and transformation of strategic action fields, how actors vie
for advantage given the opportunities and crises, and how this can help bring a better
understanding of the structural and cultural contexts that cross-border governance works in the
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Paso del Norte region. There is a lack of research to comprehend this complex and evolving
phenomenon in the borderland. The theory of fields proposed by Fligstein and McAdam (2012)
will be explained further in the next chapter and offers a unique insight on the security strategic
action field in the Paso del Norte region. Furthermore, to complement the field theory, I add
elements of both Martínez (1994a) and Payan’s (2010) work.
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Chapter 3: Theoretical framework
This chapter will explain the theoretical framework in detail, using theory of fields by
Fligstein and McAdam (2012), border identity (Martínez 1994a), and Payan’s (2010) border
typology, with an explanation to how these theories relate to and can be applied to the field
research of the Paso del Norte region. Using these theories will be central to the analysis and
interpretation of the qualitative portion of this research.

3.1 FIELD THEORY
The primary theoretical framework used is field theory by Fligstein and McAdam (2012),
who propose a general theory based on social change and stability established on strategic action
fields, which are constructed mesolevel orders contrived by actors who interact, operate through
shared understandings, concede, and abide by rules that govern in a set field. The authors argue
that researching these fields, their change, and settlement is central to social scientists who are
interested in the logic of collective action, how actors seek opportunities, the skills they execute,
what they accomplish, and how they sustain order (2012: xiii). Chapter 1 of this thesis provided a
summary on the central elements of the theory, and this section will present analyze the theory
further, relating it to the U.S.-Mexico border.
First, to recapitulate, there are seven key elements proposed by Fligstein and McAdam:
1. Strategic action fields
2. Incumbents, challengers, and governance units
3. Social skill and the existential functions of the social
4. The broader field environment
5. Exogenous shocks, mobilization, and the onset of contention
6. Episodes of contention
7. Settlement
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An emerging field is one that is a “social space where rules do not yet exist but where
actors by virtue or emerging, dependent interests and worldviews, are being forced increasingly
to take one another into account in their actions” (87). Field emergence on the U.S.-Mexico
border can be seen historically, as the physical boundary was formalized through the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, and continuing to this moment, where increasingly both nations
have to take each other into account and interaction occurs on a daily basis. While the authors
argue that they do not wish “overstate the degree to which social space is independent of
geographic space,” (63) however, for the purpose of this research, geographic space is a defining
factor within this particular field, the border, where two countries and communities interact on a
daily basis through shared understandings.
The authors contend there are three types of relationships between strategic action fields:
unconnected, hierarchical or dependent, and reciprocal or interdependent. This relationship is
shaped by factors such as “resource dependence, mutual beneficial interactions, sharing of
power, information flows, and legitimacy” (59). In the case of the U.S.-Mexico border, the
relationship of the strategic action field of the Paso del Norte region is highly dependent
(hierarchical) on the security field, in most, if not all sectors. Payan (2006:5) explains how the
U.S. government is the “primary agent” in decisions along the border, and what the “rules
governing trans-boundary activity should be.” Additionally, Fligstein and McAdam point out
that depending on the number and nature of links there are between strategic action fields, can
affect the likeliness of a crisis to spill over into other fields. The U.S.-Mexico border, because of
its nature, is subject to even more complexities as it deals with two nations and governmental
systems, and two cultures overwhelmingly affecting its stability, therefore many issues or fields
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are subject to feel the ripple effect. I argue, that in the case of the strategic action field of the
Paso del Norte, security connects and affects all fields.
Furthermore, fields are shaped depending on situation and issues at stake (10). The
authors posit that shared understandings are made of the situation, power dominance of actors,
the set of understandings regarding the “rules” in the field, and how actors make sense of what
other actors are doing (11). Actors, who can be either incumbents or challengers, are vying for
advantage to be able to redefine the rules, maintain the status quo of the field, or what position
they occupy in a given field.
Those who have more power in a given field are referred to as incumbents, whose
interests and views dominate the strategic action field. On the other hand, challengers are those
who hold less power and influence. While Fligstein and McAdam propose general characteristics
of these actors, and who these actors is an important part of field analysis. However, in their
theory the authors do not specifically account for the state in their challenger/incumbent model.
Instead, they portray the state as an external actor. They argue that the state is a set of strategic
action fields that claims to “make and enforce authoritative rules over a specified geographic
territory” (68), and the authors posit the state has its own “interests, identities, and institutional
missions, which routinely affect non-state fields” (173). Yet the authors do not mention the
overlap in strategic action fields between state actors, as such is the case of the borderlands,
where two state actors interact over a specified geographic territory. Especially when there is a
state actor who is stable and another state actor is in turbulence/insecurity. However, they do
mention the European Union, as a case for new field emergence, creating new fields in economy
and political life (Fligstein 2008 as cited in Fligstein and McAdam 2012).
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Indeed, the border is a complex discussion within field theory. The authors spend most of
Chapter 3 (57-82) discussing broader macro-environment the role of formal bureaucracies and
state and non-state relationships. Yet in the U.S.-Mexico border, the state is the defining actor in
protecting and operating the flow of movement and goods to either country. The argument in this
thesis is that because the state is seen as an incumbent, and its bureaucratic and governance units
benefit from their dominance, thus leaves other state actors and challengers from both countries
with little power or influence in decisions that affect their lives every day.

3.2 SOCIAL SKILL
Fligstein and McAdam’s present an important element: social skill. It refers to how, what
and why actors achieve collective action. Field stability/instability is highly dependent on the use
of social skill by its actors. However, research has been limited on what kind of processes, skills
and actions helps these actors gain advantages. Social skills are defined as “the ability to induce
cooperation by appealing to and helping to create shared meanings and collective identities”
(46). This element is key to this research, as social skills are operationalized through the in-depth
interviews in the Paso del Norte region with key cross-border governance stakeholders.
Moreover, there are certain actors who are more eloquent, thus encouraging cooperation. These
skilled social actors are referred to as “institutional entrepreneurs” or agents of change (4). These
skilled social actors can exist as either challenger or incumbent. Fligstein and McAdam
(2012:97) explain that as a skilled social incumbent, they will have certain advantages, such as
more resources and connections, including those in the state. On the other hand, while skilled
social challengers might be limited in that sense, the authors argue that they employ tactics,
among them being alliances with other groups in other fields or powerful individuals or groups,
or allying with incumbent groups to gain a better advantage (98). Ultimately social skills and
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how actors spark collective action depends highly on where they are in a field and how they take
advantage of opportunities.

3.3 EXISTENTIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE SOCIAL AND BORDER IDENTITY
The concept of ‘existential functions of the social’ provides the basis of social skills and
strategic action. This concept refers to the unique capacity of humans as the need to find
meaning and identity in our lives, as “people do what they do both to achieve instrumental
advantage and to fashion meaningful worlds for themselves and others” (43). This element is of
particular interest, as people living and working in the borderlands fashion a unique identity,
fronterizos (borderlanders), who most argue are not understood by those in the nation’s capitals,
Washington D.C and Mexico City, because their lives are intertwined on both sides on the
border. Raimondo Strassoldo (as cited in Martínez 1994a:19) identifies three psychological
currents:
“The first is the ambiguous identity of individuals who feel genuinely pulled in two
directions for linguistic, cultural and economic reasons. The second is a lack of strong
identification with the national State, the sense that we are sui generis and unlike the
populations of the heartlands of States. The third is an extreme defensive nationalism
based on real or imagined dangers from across the frontier. The peculiar and specific
mixtures of ambivalence, rational calculation and anxiety have made the populations of
frontier regions historically interesting and important.”
Martinez’s (1994a) model of borderland interaction and whose theory I draw upon, argues border
people operate in an environment known as borderlands milieu, which is a mix of “unique
forces, processes and characteristics that set borderlands apart from interior zones” (10). Figure
3.1 depicts the elements that incorporate the ‘borderlands milieu’. These processes have been
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widely misunderstood by some incumbents, leading to policies and ‘rules’ that clash at the
border.

Figure 3.1 Major Contributors to the Borderlands Milieu
Source: Martínez 1994b:8

3.4 CHANGES IN STRATEGIC ACTION FIELDS
Fields are always changing and can be weakened or destabilized by exogenous shocks.
The authors explain three sources of field destabilization: “invasion by outside groups, changes
in fields upon which the strategic action field in question is dependent, and those rare
macroevents (e.g., war, depression) that serve to destabilize the broader social/political context in
which the field is embedded” (99). U.S.-Mexico border has experienced multiple shocks such as
the security field that changed rules of the game for the borderland, and macroevents, including
9/11, Mexico’s drug war and economic depression, among others. Yet, while a field may
experience moments of change or destabilization, it is where opportunities arise for actors to
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either gain advantage, changing the rules, mobilize and act. However, it is important to note that
all actors, even those that may benefit from such a crisis, have a stake in restoring order (22).
The authors depict the process of the onset of contention (see Figure 3.2) by which actors will
acknowledge a threat/opportunity, direct organizational resources to mobilize action, and engage
in collective action (21). As such, the destabilizing changes leave the field in a sense of
uncertainty about the field in question, such as rules and changes in power, but actors engaging
in collective action can reach a settlement.
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Attribution
of threat/
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Social appropriation

Innovative
collective action

Escalation
of
perceived
uncertainty

Destabilizing
changes

Challenger

Attribution
of threat/
opportunity

Social appropriation

Innovative
collective action

Figure 3.2 Exogenous Shocks, Mobilization, and Onset of Contention Process
Source: Fligstein and McAdam (2012:20)

3.5 SETTLEMENT, FIELD STABILITY, AND ‘COOPERATION’
Moreover, a settlement in a field can happen either through successful oppositional
mobilization or the reversion to the status quo. As aforementioned, every actor has a claim in
restoring order, and skilled social actors are extremely important in creating a consensus and
forging cooperation among the actors in the field. Furthermore, the authors believe field stability
happens by either the dominant group imposing their power or by the formation of a coalition
through cooperation of actors, all leading to whether the strategic action field is built on
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“coercion, competition or cooperation,” or involving all three (14). However, Fligstein and
McAdam do not elaborate much on cooperation. Cooperation, according to the authors, involves
“building a political coalition…rooted in a combination of shared interests and a common
collective identity” (15). And importantly, this cooperation depends highly on socially skilled
actors, who can convey their message to the field in question.
This leads to the incorporation of the third theoretical framework, Payan’s (2006) border
typology among the terms coordination, cooperation, and collaboration. Yet while many use the
terms interchangeably, the terms differ in types of structures and processes they aim to reach
(Payan 2010; Cruz 2014). Payan illustrates seven components to each term: 1) objectives, 2)
vision, 3) acknowledgement of interdependence, 4) mechanisms of interaction, 5) purpose of the
system, 6) requirements, and 7) physical location of participants. In order to understand
governance in the Paso del Norte region, greater detail is required in how these actors truly
cooperate, if at all, in security issues. This framework will allow a greater comparison and
examination of what is at stake, the actors that dominate the field and what is needed to spur
collaboration in the region.
Thus, the theoretical framework proposed in this thesis is based on Fligstein and
McAdam (2012) and their strategic action field theory. However, in relation to the U.S.-Mexico
border, the theory fails to account for many complex issues that govern field dynamics in crossborder communities like the Paso del Norte region and other international fields. Therefore,
complementing the strategic action field theory with Martínez (1994a) and Payan (2010) together
can provide a more thorough analysis of how actors interact in field governance of the Paso del
Norte region. The next chapter will explain the methodology and the approach to the strategic
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action field of the Paso del Norte region, using the methodological considerations by Fligstein
and McAdam (2012).
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Chapter 4: Methodology
The purpose of this study is to provide a meso-level examination of the Paso del Norte
region in order to identify the incumbents, challengers, and governance units and crises to better
understand the dynamics of cross-border governance in the region. This chapter will describe the
research methodology, data collection procedure, confidentiality of participants’, limitations, and
analysis approach.

4.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research is qualitative and uses a combination of semi-structures interviews, text
analyses of scholarly and government documents and publications, participant observation in
conferences, presentations and events. As aforementioned, the research was approved by the
University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). Additionally, the project has also been reviewed
by the Ethics Review Board of the University of Regina. The IRB filings were meant to mirror
their ethics clearance proposal because the project is designed to have a comparative component
and for that reason the research collaborators and research assistant consulted heavily with the
principal investigator and Regina’s ethics application submission.
The interview guide (See appendix A) was created by the El Paso-Ciudad Juárez team in
constant communication with the principal investigator, Dr. Bruno Dupeyron and his research
assistant, Nikolina Vracar, in order to make sure the core of the interview guide adapted to the
methodological considerations proposed by Fligstein and McAdam (2012:165-167). The
interview guide followed a semi-structured format, allowing interviewees the opportunity to
speak freely about their experiences on cross-border governance. Additionally, the interview
guide was designed in Spanish and English in order to accommodate interviewees’ preferences,
as many are bilingual, but at times feel more comfortable speaking in one language than the
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other. The interview guide consisted of 8 sections- personal information, border
experience/exposure, current professional position, organization/institution/business and its
border network, how to give those challenges and obstacles a resolution, beyond the border,
cross-border sociability, and reflections and recommendations. The guide amounted to 61
questions and was meant to provide the researchers with knowledge on the dynamics of crossborder governance in the Paso del Norte region.

4.2 DATA COLLECTION
Given the nature of this research, the participants were not randomly selected, but rather
identified for their cross-border governance work and their role in the evolution of border
dynamics in the Paso del Norte region. In the initial phase of determining who would be invited
to participate in the face-to-face interviews, I created a contact list, containing names and
organizations of interest to interview in El Paso, while Héctor Gómez and Alejandra Payan
created the Juárez list. The lists were created through knowledge of cross-border institutions and
organizations, web analysis, El Paso Inc. Book of Lists, and references. The list was separated by
sectors, and included details of the organization or individuals, contact information, address,
email and additional notes. Combined, the El Paso-Ciudad Juárez list totaled over 100 possible
interviewees. Then, the lists were then distributed to the El Paso-Juarez collaborators (Dr. Tony
Payan, Dr. Kathleen Staudt, Dr. Consuelo Pequeño, and Dr. Patricia Barraza de Anda) who
assessed the list. The sample was selected to include individuals based on the following
characteristics:

mid

to

high

level

employees

and

their

involvement

cross-border

organizations/businesses/institutions, notable individuals with previous experience in crossborder governance issues, and recommendations from interviewees (See Appendix A) as
Question 60 asked: “Who else do you think I should talk to?”
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Initial contact was an invitation letter to their organization/business mailing address (see
Appendix C), and was sent out to 89 contacts in El Paso on June 27, 2013. Follow up emails
were sent on July 1, 2013 asking individuals to indicate a day, time, and place to set up an
interview. Interviews were scheduled from July-December 2013 (with an additional interview in
May 2014). Before the interview commenced, the researcher would explain the study, answer
any questions and then interviewees were asked to sign a consent form (See Appendix D)
agreeing to participate in the interview. The consent form also asked permission to be audio/
video recorded, permission to use organization’s name and interviewee’s professional position,
option to remain anonymous or to use a pseudonym, and permission to be quoted. The Paso del
Norte region gathered 71 interviews; 34 conducted in Ciudad Juárez and 37 in El Paso.
Moreover, the interviews lasted on average from 30 to 90 minutes. The sample for this study
includes 26 face-to-face interviews with key cross-border governance stakeholders in the
business/economic sector and political/security sector, 4 El Paso Inc. Q&A (in-depth interviews),
and 4 conference/speeches. Appendix E contains the list of interviewees used in this research.

4.3 CONFIDENTIALITY OF PARTICIPANTS
All participants agreed to be audio recorded to ensure an accurate documentation of
responses. The audio files are kept under lock Dr. Tony Payan’s office on an encrypted and
password protected hard disk at the University of Texas at El Paso. According to the IRB
proposal, data will be stored on an encrypted and password protected hard disk drive at the
University of Texas at El Paso, University of Regina, the Autonomous University of Barcelona
or the Colegio de la Frontera Norte, for a period of six years. After six years the data will deleted
and/or destroyed.
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4.4 LIMITATIONS
Moreover, research collaborators identified two limits of confidentiality of participants:
the limit due to the nature and size of the sample in the region interviewed, and procedures for
recruiting or selecting participants that may compromise the confidentiality of participants
(Dupeyron 2012a). Taking into account these two limits, interviewees will not be named in the
analysis, as some of the topics discussed are politically sensitive (i.e. Mexico’s drug war,
security issues), unless the information gathered was through a public speech, published in-depth
interview or conference.

4.5 ANALYSIS APPROACH
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) posit qualitative and quantitative techniques when using
their framework in the study of a particular field. The authors also explain the different
philosophies, positivist and realist approaches that may aid the researcher in their interest in
explaining phenomena or using case studies to test parts of the theory (184). This research leans
towards a realist approach, as it aims to examine the structure, set of understandings of
governance and dynamics of the Paso del Norte field incorporating the borderlands complex
culture and history. Moreover, following Creswell (2009:185), this research uses a hierarchical
approach to data analysis, involving gathering raw data, organizing and preparing for analysis,
reading through the data, coding the data, finding themes and descriptions, interrelating the
themes/description, and interpreting the meaning of the themes/description.
Accordingly, this qualitative research relies on semi-structures interviews, text analyses
of scholarly and government documents and publications, and participant observation in
conferences, presentations and events. The researcher listened to the in-depth interviews again;
creating field notes, semi-transcribing representative quotes, and coding emerging trends/patterns
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from the 26 face-to-face interviews (116 pages, single spaced). The next chapter will contain the
identified categories and analysis for the Paso del Norte region using economic and political
perspectives.
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Chapter 5: Identified Categories and Analysis
This chapter will explain the identified categories and the analysis under a theoretical
context from the semi-structures interviews, text analyses of scholarly and government
documents and publications, and participant observation through conferences and events. The
analysis is offered in two parts. Part I will address the analysis focusing on the categories, and
Part II will be used to evaluate and discuss the research questions and hypotheses investigated.

5.1 IDENTIFIED CATEGORIES
Figure 5.1 illustrates the identification of categories, which encompass the theoretical
frameworks used in this research to further understand the Paso del Norte region. Each category
brings a better understanding of actors, existential functions of the social of actors in the region,
who has power, crises that affect the field, episodes of cooperation, and who are socially skilled
actors that motivate action in the field.

Table 5.1 Identified Categories Pertaining to Theoretical Framework
Identified Categories
Shared Understandings

Theoretical Framework
Fligstein and McAdam (2012)

Borderland Identity

Oscar Martínez (1994a), Fligstein and McAdam (2012)

Crises and Field Stability

Fligstein and McAdam (2012), Oscar Martínez (1994a)

Innovative Action and Cooperation

Tony Payan (2010), Fligstein and McAdam (2012)

Socially Skilled Actors

Fligstein and McAdam (2012)

The first category is shared understandings. Fligstein and McAdam (2012:9) define
strategic action fields as “constructed mesolevel social order in which actors (who can be
individual or collective) are attuned to and interact with one another on the basis of shared
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(which is not to say consensual) understandings about the purpose of the field, relationships to
others in the field (including who has power and why), and the rules governing legitimate action
in the field.” Using Fligstein and McAdam’s theory of fields, the first category aims to provide
an explanation of the shared understandings by actors and who they identify to have power and
why in the Paso del Norte region.
The second category is identity. Borderlanders often identify themselves as being
different than their counterparts at the nation/state level. Many claim the border to be a unique
place that at times is misunderstood because others do not see the interrelated nature of the
community within the borderland. The analysis covers Martínez’s (1994a) concept of
‘borderland milieu’ which has the elements of transnational interaction, separateness, ethnic
conflict and accommodation, and international conflict and accommodation to better understand
the forces and processes that drive borderland actors of the Paso del Norte region. How actors
view themselves and how they interpret the actions of other actors due to their unique
environment are important in understanding the actions they take.
The third category is crises and shocks to the Paso del Norte field. Interviewees recount
events they believe had an impact in the region. Oscar Martínez (1994a) describes borderlanders
to see themselves differently than those who are not from the borderland. Furthermore, Martínez
(1994a:23) argues
“Borderlanders’ sense of being different often has far-reaching political consequences for
both the borderlands and the nations to which they belong. By virtue of their distance and
isolation from the heartlands, coupled with unique local ethnic and economic
characteristics, borderlanders frequently develop interests that clash with the central
governments or with mainstream cultures.”
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By exploring these crises and shocks that change and transform the field, a better comprehension
is provided to how borderlander’s feel on security issues that have had an impact in their lives.
This leads to the next category, innovative action and cooperation. This category will explore
some of the actions that interviewees in business and political/security sector take to spur
innovative action in the region. Using the border typology of the terms coordination,
cooperation, and collaboration by Payan (2010), will help better recognize the type of actions
that have been taken and why.
Finally, the fifth category is socially skilled actors. During the interview sessions,
interviewees recognized and identified certain actors who act as catalyst and motivators for
better change in the Paso del Norte region. These actors are unique in the sense they work in and
around the system and rules to gain a better leverage for their community. By analyzing these
socially skilled actors, there may be a better understanding of how and what these actors do to
inspire change and bring new opportunities to the Paso del Norte region.

5.2 ANALYSIS PART I: SHARED UNDERSTANDINGS
Because fields are forged through shared understandings, it is necessary to unfold these
understandings in the Paso del Norte field. The shared understandings that perdure in this region,
much like our interviewees disclose, characterize the Paso del Norte region as one where an
international boundary separates two countries, one stronger than the other, dictates much of
their lives, especially when issues of national security arise. However, most interviewees
acknowledge that because they live in a geographic position that is bound by two countries, at
times national policy will clash with how borderlanders live their lives, working in a community
that encompasses two different cities in different countries, but one that has a shared history and
culture. “As a Mexican country, we have to be very respectful because it is a domestic political
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decision, in principle, with international implications, but domestic policy nonetheless,” says one
interviewee regarding immigration reform, an issue which at times is correlated with security.
Along similar lines, another interviewee comments on national decisions on the borderland, “in
the end, they are decisions that a country has to take, like customs, is a country issue. The wait
times that we have from here to El Paso, is a federal decision of the American government due to
issues or justifications of security and health.” However, as interviewees acknowledge shared
understandings that structure the U.S-Mexico border, many are not concordant. They feel as if
national governments do not understand the way a cross-border community like the Paso del
Norte region works, “because they do not live it, they do not know it,” says an owner of a
general freight carrier company in Ciudad Juárez.
When security issues become a priority, many interviewees identified that their needs,
whether personal or business is halted, such as when crossing the international ports of entry
takes hours, or in drastic events where the borders are temporarily shut down (i.e. 9/11). A
Mexican chamber employee comments on cross-border challenges and obstacles, “at the
international ports of entry, both ways we have a problem. And people here [Juárez] prefer not to
go. And from there [El Paso] to here… because when you come back to Juárez from El Paso
there are such long lines. That takes us out of the market completely.”
Moreover, interviewees comment on factors that hinder cross-border businesses to
thrive. Long wait times and added inspections, which deter consumers/shoppers to cross, are
among the factors hurting cross-border businesses. A governance unit employee comments,
“Yes there is reason to be concerned about security, but I mean since September 11, if I
ask any of the security experts how many terrorist have been apprehended at the border, I
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would be surprised if they say one or two. Addressing the border from the security aspect
is the wrong focus, it needs to be addressed from the economic and trade aspect.”
However, as the business sector relies on consumers and profits, they are quick to adapt to
policies that are imposed on a federal level, even if they do not agree with how they are
implemented. When asked who the most are challenging groups of people interviewees have
dealt with, most said it was individuals at the federal level, in both Washington D.C and Mexico
City. “We do not blame them, perhaps are prepared or bring the knowledge of problems in
communities from the central, west and south of the country, but we have to acknowledge that
they do not know the needs that we have as an international community,” says a Mexican
interviewee. Furthermore, in our guide, we were interested in finding the changes and
adaptations interviewees and their sectors implemented in order to adapt to the changing border
environment (See Appendix A, Question 28). In response to that question, an interviewee in a
general freight company says, “we have had to change our policies, become efficient…. our
business mentality is different, because we know we have a big risk in the moment we cross the
border,” which includes anti-doping of truck drivers, training, C‐TPAT certification, bilingual
employees, and K9 units to check outgoing cargo.

5.2.1 Who governs the field?
In order to understand the actors (incumbents) who possess greater power in the Paso del
Norte field, the interview guide contained questions such as: “Are there any specific
events/people/phenomena/law/policy that has made the border better or worse?, “Who are the
people you think most influence the way the border is?,” “Who are the most influential people on
the border, according to your opinion?,” “Do you know notable individuals or actors who have
encouraged/discouraged cross-border cooperation? If so, please specify” and “What are the
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major actors and factors that will likely facilitate/block efficient and functional cross-border
governance?” Almost ubiquitously, interviewees identified actors in the two nations’ capitals,
Washington D.C and Mexico City, as those who influence the way the border is governed, along
with their control of federal law and policies, policymakers, and vast resources dominated by a
centralized security agenda. Border stakeholders interviewed felt like their needs or voices were
not taken into account. “There has been a democratic deficit at the border, because border
residents are perhaps the most affected by any scaffolding around the borderline, and are the
least consulted on how their lives are affected,” comments Dr. Tony Payan at the Beyond
NAFTA: Streamlining the Border to Strengthen North American Competitiveness Conference in
Bellingham, WA (2014). Similarly, many interviewees mentioned specific crises and policies,
such as the drug war in U.S. and Mexico, NAFTA, immigration reform, and border security that
disproportionally affect border communities.
Furthermore, in analyzing incumbents’ resources, when asked “the human, technical and
financial resources that are available within the government to support cross-border interaction?”
a governance unit actor responds that U.S federal government agencies provide a lot of funding
throughout the region, but provides it for the wrong reasons; “we are building walls. Come on,
we should be tearing down the walls,” says the interviewee. Additionally, Mexican interviewees
mention specific problems in Mexico’s governmental system, including the mayor’s inability to
make decisions, difficulty in acquiring federal resources, and changes in policy and
administration. On the U.S. side, an interviewee comments how “Congress has a huge impact on
what happens on the border… [it] is a power player on the U.S side and that’s why we focus so
much on our attention on other members of Congress, educating them and hopefully shifting
their views on Mexico and the border.” Dispelling myths and wrongful depictions and
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perceptions on the border is a daily experience for some cross-border stakeholders, as they try to
spur tourism back into the region, or attract businesses to relocate, and it doesn’t help that it is at
times in the federal level (i.e. members of Congress) that at times propagate some of these
myths. Congressman Beto O’Rourke, from the 16th District of Texas, comments at the Texas–
Chihuahua-New Mexico Regional Economic Competitiveness Forum (2014),
“When we fail to define the border to the rest of the world, to the folks in Washington
D.C or Mexico City, we allow them to define the border for us, and the policy that flows
from that, I don’t have to tell you, is not always good policy. It does not always
encourage the trade and the commerce and the legitimate flow of people and ideas and
culture and art between our two countries through this hemisphere, those things that not
only make El Paso more successful and more competitive, but make the United States
more successful and more competitive.”
Moreover, it is important to note that interviewees not only cite federal governments as
incumbents, but remark the difference in visions, priorities and interest of both countries, leaving
challengers further from progressing to real change in the region. When asked “what were the
most detrimental factors for cross-border governance”, a Mexican interviewee says,
“I think the interests of governments are not the same. When interests are not the same or
we do not align ourselves towards guidelines of cooperation, we will be in continuous
disagreement, which does not lead us to make agreements that really benefit the
communities in this cross-border region.”
Many interviewees argue that locally, there seems to be more consensuses on the interests they
would like to prioritize. They see trade and economic interest as bringing a more benefits than
what the security paradigm does. “We are in a world economy now, and we need to understand
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that. Mexico being strong is totally to our advantage, so we have to seek solutions to security
issues that will enable commerce much more efficiently,” says a former mayor. Yet when asked
“what do government entities do in order to facilitate your institution's needs/border work?”
some of their answers echoes the same narrative: “I could answer that question more easily if I
told you what they do to hinder,” “they don’t do anything,” and “I don’t think governmental
entities have fulfilled their obligation to be business facilitators.”. However, an interviewee who
works for a governance unit at the federal level comments,
“I think at the local level, Juárez and El Paso work very well together, no doubt about it,
the mayors work very well. At the state level, I’m not so sure. At the federal level?
Definitely not. But I think there is more attention being put in the border starting last
year. There’s more focus on this region. And why I say that? I’m in Washington, I attend
meetings and I hear the importance of the border, the importance of Mexico to the U.S
and vice versa… I believe now we are at the right track, but there is the biggest gap right
now at the federal level.”
Indeed, a theme worth exploring is the interaction between governance units and challengers.
While some interviewees mention governance units do little or nothing to help their efforts, the
account of an interviewee working at a security governance unit points out their own obstacles
and challenges working in the field, while an interviewee in business development identifies
alliances with governance units that help them bring a better understanding to the region.

5.2.2 Governance Units
Because most identification of incumbents has been placed in federal levels actors in the
nation’s capitals, Washington D.C and Mexico City, a closer look at the governance units that
operate on the border provides a good view on incumbent’s interests and views on a particular
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field. It is important to note that the concept of internal governance units by Fligstein and
McAdam (2012) slightly differs in the way this research views governance units, and it is
because we focus on two state actors which both have governance units on each side of the
border, interacting with other actors such as challengers, and ultimately enforce state rules and
regulations. For example, Fligstein and McAdam (2012:78) hold that internal governance units
are created often “during the founding of the field or at times of crisis, to institutionalize the
worldview and advantages of the incumbents.” The creation of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security and the shift towards preventing terrorism and security dominated the
discussion could be seen as an example of the creation of a governance unit under a time of
crisis, which proceeded to affect the Paso del Norte field, with additional border security. The
discourse some of the governance units heavily reflects policies and views from incumbents
identified in Washington D.C and Mexico City. Why? Not only do these governance units
depend on federal policies, but their budget and resources come from incumbents in those
positions. A governance unit interviewee mentions an “enormous amount of resources,” along
the border, such as manpower, technology (radio, drones) and infrastructure. “The borders will
always be seen as a place where we are vulnerable,” says the governance unit interviewee. When
asked on how their work is impacted by the border, specifically on security issues, the
interviewee says,
“The way we operated prior to 9/11, and then after. Well our mission has always been to
protect the citizens of the United States, to protect the border. Our focus changed to
terrorist and terrorist weapons, so anything that is security related is huge for us and for
me personally.”
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However, it is also important to note that while these governance units hold incumbent views and
interests collectively, on an individual level, actors working within these governance units may
see the Paso del Norte region differently than their counterparts in Washington D.C and Mexico
City. This next section provides a view of some governance unit actors and some of their work
with business actors in the Paso del Norte region.
The relationship between governance units operating at the Paso del Norte region and
regional actors is an interesting one. While their interests and views at times may differ, some
challengers acknowledge their operation is highly dependent on decisions from Washington D.C
and Mexico City. An interviewee whose work focuses on U.S. border policy explains that in
such a system dominated by a centralized security agenda, the frameworks governance units are
given to operate are inadequate. The interviewee goes on to say, “in all sincerity they are trying
to do their best at carrying out a very profoundly flawed set of policies… I also think they are
wrong for the border region.” Moreover, some interviewees acknowledge such obstacles
governance units also face. One interviewee recounts that at times when they have travelled to
Washington D.C, representing the Paso del Norte community, it is also “including those who that
are in uniform to convey messages that they are not able to convey to the upper management
without putting their careers in peril.” Challengers will often make alliances with governance
units to improve the position of the Paso del Norte region. These alliances can be seen through
private-public partnerships. Governance units and the business sector often engage in a daily
interaction along the borderline. However, while governance units are state allies, the
interviewee comments on their relationship,
“They don’t see us, in the business sector, as their enemy, they see us as their ally. We
certainly see them as our ally, we see ourselves as their allies, working with them, to try
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as best we can to change policy when we can and when we cannot, to work within those
policies to make it just a little better”
However, their relationship at times clashes when interests or policies differ. A local government
employee addresses a question on the fundamental values that key governance actors share in the
region,
“People here have a much more honest and acute understanding of the dynamics of the
border…we have adopted policies where our local law enforcement do not enforce
immigration laws. We think that is counterproductive to developing trusting
relationships.”
Similarly, many interviewees claimed a better understanding of the Paso del Norte region, such
as the nature of the interaction and relationships of a binational, bicultural community, often
referring to the two cities as sister cities. Moreover, a common occurrence that was found in the
interviews brought views of identity, with many referring themselves as fronterizos
(borderlanders) and who argue they are often not understood by those in their nations’ capitals
for their interconnected lives on the border. The second category analyzed, identity, will address
interviewees views on identity and how they view the region under the theoretical lens of
Martínez (1994a) borderland milieu and Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) existential functions of
the social.

5.3 BORDERLAND IDENTITY
“Donde nací y de donde soy son dos cosas diferentes,” (Where I was born and where I
am from are two different things) says a Mexican interviewee who was born in another city in
Mexico, but now identifies as a fronterizo (borderlander). “My heart is here” says another. The
identity of borderlanders in the Paso del Norte region is connected to both cities. It is not
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uncommon for individuals to commute from Ciudad Juárez to El Paso and vice versa, even at a
daily, weekly or monthly basis. Many business interviewees contend that because they live in
such a unique geographical position, they are open to more opportunities and living at the border
made them successful. “I sometimes compare how my life would be in another city in Mexico
and how it is at the border, and I would not have the same possibilities to get ahead... because
our country denies the opportunity to have so many options as the ones we fronterizos have,”
says an owner of a Mexican business. Many regard their facility to understand two culture and
languages to be a great asset in collaborative efforts. “The fact that I am bicultural, bilingual and
am for both sides of the border will give me a leg up,” said Rolando Pablos, CEO of a private,
non-profit corporation called Borderplex Alliance, whose interest focuses on economic
development and business recruitment to the Paso del Norte region (El Paso Inc., 2013). Also,
the interviews led to an identification of interconnectedness individuals’ from this region share is
one where they describe as unique and different from other parts of the two nations. A Mexican
governance unit employee works on promoting financial and economic development says during
his reflection on the border,
“The border is an area of opportunity; it is an area where if you were born here, we have
a very peculiar sentiment. First, we are deep rooted Mexican nationals, because we
defend them…that opportunity to be proud nationals, but also aware that we live in a
different way other nationals live. Here we have common needs, but we have unique
needs that as a cross-border community only has.”
Furthermore, many interviewees argue that because they live in a different environment, at an
international boundary line, they are often neglected or not consulted when federal policymakers
in Washington D.C or Mexico City set national policies that result in changes to the way they
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live their lives and/or conduct business. Additionally, in the business environment, cross-border
businesses work with two different governmental systems and policies that at times differ in their
policy priorities. “While we are partners geographically and culturally, from a governance
standpoint and security standpoint, we couldn’t be further apart,” says a former mayor.
Furthermore, as Martínez (1994a:18) points out, “borderlanders think of themselves as different
from people of interior zones.” There are some interviewees, however, whose work involves
bringing awareness to Washington D.C and Mexico City, because they claim those actors do not
understand “the reality of the border.” Many acknowledge that because they live in a unique
environment, and one with unfortunate crises, such as the violence in one side due to Mexico’s
war against drug trafficking, it creates what an interviewee describes as an “interesting
dichotomy of one of the most dangerous cities in the world directly across the bridge from safest
city in America…it’s a concept that many Americans cannot wrap their minds around…it is a
challenge for us to educate.”
Many interviewees believe that through proper awareness and education about the
dynamic in the region, the profits and trade between U.S. and Mexico will ultimately lead
nation’s capitals to properly address the problems unique to their geographic and perhaps to
culturally to an extent. When interviewees were asked on their vision for the future of the border,
many interviewees longed to be considered as one region. Some interviewees argued that
economically they would be “more competitive” says a Mexican businessman, or to address the
media or peoples’ perception of the region. “Juárez suffers the same image that El Paso does. We
are in this together,” says David Saucedo, a cross-border businessman, at the “Looking East:
European and US-Mexico Border Studies” event held at the University of Texas at El Paso
(2014).
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However, while there are very strong ties within the region, the theme of resentment and
loyalty during unstable times also appears in some interviews. One interviewee says that “in the
wake of the economic crisis and violence, many networks we had disappeared.” Another
commented on how during Mexico’s drug war violence, in 2010, the El Paso Convention and
Visitors Bureau changed their maps to not include the ‘war-torn’ violent city of Ciudad Juárez.
The next category addresses security issues and crises that have changed field dynamics.

5.4 CRISES AND FIELD STABILITY
The Paso del Norte region has experienced multiple shocks and ruptures as a result of
both proximate and distant fields and events. As our interviewees recount, the major crises that
have changed the Paso del Norte field have revolved around security. There are three major
crises interviewees mention –the terrorist attacks of New York and Washington D.C on
September 11, 2001, the economic crisis, and Mexico’s drug war against drug trafficking.
When asking interviewees if there were any specific events, people, phenomena, law, or
policy that has made the border better or worse or how has their experience with the border
changed over time, many mentioned September 11th (also referred to as 9/11). While 9/11
happened in a distant field, the extent of the crisis it spawned hit the U.S-Mexico in an
unparalleled manner, because despite the crisis happening 13 years ago, interviewees still cite it
as a major change in the Paso del Norte field dynamics. “That changed our lives forever,” says
an interviewee. “September 11th was definitely the biggest thing,” comments a security
governance unit actor. Interviewees mention the additional scrutiny of people who crossed,
inspections, longer lines, the border wall that caused a backlashed in the Paso del Norte field as a
result.
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Moreover, in Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012:193) methodological considerations, a
realist analysis should take into account the structure of a particular situation and its historicalcultural context. At the “Looking East: European and US-Mexico Border Studies” event held at
the University of Texas at El Paso (2014), Dr. Oscar Martínez, whose research focuses on the
political, economic, and social history of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, offers a historical
perspective to such crises:
“September 11th is a big problem, so we are living with that now, but really the
foundation of the problem is that you have economic asymmetry between Mexico and
United States. These kinds of issues go back to early beginnings of Mexico as a country,
back to the 1820s when the relationship between the United States and Mexico started.
And that asymmetry has driven these relationships on the border…. And when you throw
in the drug trade, the drug consumption in the U.S, and flow of arms into Mexico, it
complicates life tremendously in Mexico, and complicates our lives here in the border.”
Similarly, one Mexican interviewee spoke of “unequal opportunities,” saying that we could not
talk about competitiveness until we addressed poverty in the city. Another mentioned lack of
jobs in Juárez as a contributor to violence. However, few interviewees touch on the topic of wage
disparity. Staudt and Cruz (2014) discuss the unequal wage structure, and the workers who often
become what they term as “voiceless challengers.” Therefore, this topic brings to question
whether Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) challenger/incumbent model is missing a critical
component, or needs to be broken down into different levels of challengers and incumbents.
Furthermore, another crisis to destabilize the Paso del Norte field was Mexico’s war
against drug trafficking. Ciudad Juárez became one of the most dangerous cities in the world. “It
has been a challenge to maintain our market position…nothing that I remember has brought so
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many challenges like the violence, this war…that brought over 10,000 deaths,” says a Mexican
interviewee. Business suffered, and businesspeople often became targets to extortion and
kidnapping. A businessperson recounts,
“La violencia me ataco a mí (The violence attacked me), they kidnapped me for hours,
and we had to pay an amount [to be let go], and I was so scared that I no longer go back
to Juárez. I haven’t been there in three years. I have retired, and now I am here in El
Paso. I feel calmer.”
Another Mexican business interviewee mentions colleagues who have been killed or kidnapped.
“Nos acostumbramos a trabajar en la inseguridad,” (We grew accustomed to working under
insecurity) says a Mexican interviewee, who recalls his routine during violence in Juárez, with
six or seven escorts and bulletproof/armored cars. In such crises like Mexico’s war against drug
trafficking, where incumbents’ in national capitals were unable to stop the violence, businesses
and local actors felt that while the attention at the border grew, it was very negative. Now, an
interviewee who works in tourism comments that their latest work includes changing the image
of Juárez and mentions how the U.S. Department of State travel warning and alerts hinders
attracting people back to the city. Nonetheless, a Mexican interviewee comments that while there
was and still are problems they have to deal with, “we have flourished thanks to all the
adversities we have suffered…our advantage is that we have been good to react against
difficulties.” The next category focuses on the response (episodes of cooperation) and the
interaction of incumbent and challenger actors in the face of such crises and insecurity in the
Paso del Norte field.
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5.5 INNOVATIVE ACTION AND COOPERATION
Amidst crises and insecurity, as aforementioned, actors have a stake in restoring order
(Fligstein and McAdam 2012:104). While this section does not cover all the great work actors
engaged in during instability, it provides interviewees examples on some of the work with
incumbents, challengers, and governance units. The second part of the analysis will address the
category under Payan’s (2010) coordination, cooperation and collaboration theoretical lens.
Within the exploration of incumbent/challenger work and using governance units during
times of field instability, some interviewees highlight the private-public partnerships, such as the
Dedicated Commuter Lane (DCL). Also, interviewees mention the work of the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) and Mexican entities; for example, Chihuahua’s
Business Foundation (Fundación del Empresariado Chihuahuense (FECHAC), as some of their
projects fall under the fourth pillar of Mérida Initiative. While the Mérida Initiative is mostly
focused on the security and drug trafficking aspect, the fourth pillar seeks to help the
communities that were affected by the drug related violence in Mexico. An interviewee recounts
the agencies investment in another country; while it is different from where their resources
originate, the interviewee believes they do it because it plays an essential part to resolving the
regional problematic that exists, in issues like security. Moreover, Ian Brownlee (2014),
Consulate General of the United States of America in Ciudad Juárez examines some of the
progress made between governance units and local forces at the Rio Grande Economics
Association meeting,
“Most of the programs that the U.S. is supporting at the moment in Mexico were funded
by the Merida Initiative… the most effective activities have involved creating
partnerships with the Mexican municipal, state and federal law enforcement agencies
Here’s one example, as part of our police training assistance program, the State
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Department’s bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) provided
training and courses, such as organized crime investigations, crime scene protection, and
evidence handling procedures, in an effort to strengthen investigations, leading to
prosecutions and convictions. INL has also put on courses on softer aspects of policing as
well. We’ve trained hundreds of municipal police (transito) and first responders to
recognize and deal with signs domestic violence. Training and respect for human rights is
now a core part of the curriculum, at the state and municipal police academies.”
Additionally, Consul Brownlee mentioned USAID helping in Juárez to address the causes of
crime, life skills and stay in school programs for youth, and substance abuse awareness
programs. Moreover, as aforementioned, U.S. Department of State travel alerts and warnings
have been mentioned as hindering the image of Juárez, and business challenger voices have been
heard in their advocacy attempts. In July 2014, Consul Brownlee, mentioned that when the latest
travel warning in January is republished, they will not include the central business districts of the
cities of Chihuahua and Juárez, and will permit employees for the first time, since the consulate
murders in 2010 to visit those places.
Moreover, some interviewees saw it was the willingness of the people in Juárez and El
Paso to ask for change. A Mexican governance unit employee comments that during the violence
in Juárez, it was governmental units who united, working with federal state and local actors to
combat the insecurity. The interviewee goes on to say,
“Overall, it was the awakening of society that changed this. People began to act
differently, started to go out again; they were tired of being locked up, because the ones
who should be locked up are others. Started to go out, visit places, report when a
wrongful act was committed…even with the problems we have, it is much more peaceful
than what we had two or three years ago.”
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Interviewees also recognized the importance of placing emphasis cross-border work and best
practices from those they viewed as having a good model of cooperation. The interview guide
included a question on models of cooperation, and interviewees cited models among them being
the European Union, International Water and Boundary Commission (IBWC), Border
Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC), USAID, American Embassy, U.S-Canadian
border, and other border cities such as McAllen–Reynosa and San Diego–Tijuana. Moreover,
within these organizations, there are individuals who are considered as socially skilled actors,
pushing, motivating and encouraging new innovative forms of action. The next section will
address the narrative socially skilled actors may possess, through analyzing interviewees choice
of discourse, and end with an example of an institutional entrepreneur in the Paso del Norte
region.

5.6 SOCIALLY SKILLED ACTORS
Fligstein and McAdam (2012:46) identify social skills as “the ability to induce
cooperation by appealing to and helping to create shared meanings and collective identities.”
Interested in how these actors appeal and induce cooperation, it is substantial to analyze their
discourse. Many of our interviewees, through their in-depth knowledge of the Paso del Norte
field and cross-border governance, carry their passion and dedication of their work, and it often
shows in the way they describe the region.
The narrative challengers in the Paso del Norte region echo such a strong dedication and
most importantly a trait of challengers, always looking for opportunities despite their position in
the field. “Our cooperation makes us stronger, and we just need to understand that… all of us to
understand that, not just a few of us,” says a business interviewee. Similarly, a Mexican
interviewee says “there are a lot of people who make an effort, but we are the minority.”
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However, at the Texas-Chihuahua-New Mexico Regional Economic Competitiveness Forum
(2014), Texas State Senator José Rodríguez representing District 29 says the community must
speak up, “especially when they characterize the border as dangerous, unsecure, as a war zone.
The border region, I want to repeat, is an asset and an opportunity.” Moreover, many challengers
are motivated by continued work in cross-border governance. “We want to do something
different, something that we can call regional… we need to be innovative,” says an interviewee;
“If it is to benefit the people who are living here, and to benefit those who live over there [El
Paso]… whoever wants to help, I am willing to work with,” says another. Willingness is an
important concept challengers’ and incumbents’ possess as they assess threats and opportunities
in the field.
In order to better identify social skills, it may be useful to analyze the way actors
describe, characterize themselves and their work, and reach out to other actors in the field,
including motivating by use of identity and collectiveness. Fligstein and McAdam (2012) also
describe how actors are always looking for opportunities, even as challengers are placed in a less
advantageous position than incumbents, they will work within the system. Much like an
interviewee answers the question of how they adapted to the border environment, “because I
have lived here my entire life, and worked my professional career here, I’ve been successful
because of the fact that I know how to work in the system… like anything else, you figure out a
way to make it work.” The next section provides a closer look on a challenger who according to
many interviewees is an institutional entrepreneur that possesses the social skills necessary to
motivate change in the region.
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5.7 INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEUR PARADIGM
There are many institutional entrepreneurs working in the Paso del Norte field. However,
it is important to offer an example of the type of social skills these actors possess, how other
actors view these individuals, and their perspective of the field. Fligstein and McAdam (2012:98)
address some of the tactics employed by strategic actors in challenger positions, including
forming alliances, or “if they can ally themselves with incumbent groups.” However, the
example offered in this thesis, is that of local (turned federal) challenger, Congressman Robert
“Beto” O’Rourke.
O’Rourke, a native of the region, began in local politics, serving two terms on the El Paso
City Council. Even as a City Representative, his vision for El Paso and the region was one
upholding trade and business. “What is missing in political leadership in America today is guts. I
think the public is starving for it,” he comments during an interview with El Paso Inc. (2011).
Furthermore, as a local challenger, he took up various sensitive themes. For example, City
Representative Susie Byrd and O’Rourke wrote a book titled “Dealing Death and Drugs: The
Big Business of Dope in the U.S. and Mexico”, which was critical of the war on drugs.
In May 2012, O’Rourke transitioned from local to federal politics when he was elected in
2012 to represent the people of the 16th District of Texas. If we analyze this through the
theoretical lens of field theory by Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012), this challenger bridged the
gap between challenger and governance units, ultimately to hold an incumbent position. In an
interview with El Paso Inc. (2012) O’Rourke says,
“Far too often, we have solutions dictated to us by Washington about issues that we in El
Paso understand better than anybody else- like immigration, trade, U.S-Mexican
relations, the drug war. We are on the front lines of this drug war. Why not have our
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perspective brought to bear on this important national policy issue? I want El Paso to
contribute to the discussion.”
Fligstein and McAdam (2012:183) argue that skilled actors will see opportunities where others
don’t, and O’Rourke saw Congress as an opportunity to give the people of the Paso del Norte
region a greater voice. Furthermore, in analyzing social skills, Fligstein and McAdam (2012:51)
also discuss social skill tactics, such as agenda setting. By serving in Congress, O’Rourke
leveled the playing field at the federal level, to open up the discussion regarding views on the
border, and specifically the issue of security over business and trade. A businessman comments
that a key issue the Paso del Norte region needs to address is educating the leadership, such as
legislators from other states, whose economies and job creation depend on Mexico. “They don’t
understand that by shutting the border, making it even more secure and more difficult to cross, it
is actually cutting off their noses despite their faces…they are hurting their own economies, they
are that myopic in their vision,” says the interviewee. However, Congressman O’Rourke has
been influential in educating members of Congress, often calling them out on their prevailing
myths, hyperboles and misinformation about Mexico and the border area. Additionally, says an
American businessman regarding events that involve the international port of entry, “people like
Beto O’Rourke facilitate that to happen…they get us the permissions, they work with us, and
that respect translates to all governmental entities. We now have leaders calling us to see if they
can speak at our next meeting.”
Thus, Congressman O’Rourke is a unique case as institutional entrepreneurs, challenger,
governance unit actor, and in an incumbent position. O’Rourke possesses social skill qualities
that include appealing to the identity of fronterizos and those whose states depend on trade and
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job creation in Mexico and attempting to create a cohesive narrative of the Paso del Norte region.
When asked who and what governs the border, O’Rourke said
“It is Washington D.C and Mexico City… [it] doesn’t have to be that way. It should
obviously be those of us who live on the border…I am seeing really strong advocacy with
other border representatives…I see the tide beginning to turn.”
In order to put the interviewees’ analysis in perspective, the next section will provide a
discussion of the analysis and offer a typology of actors in relation to the challenger-incumbentgovernance unit model by Fligstein and McAdam (2012).

5.8 ANALYSIS: PART II
Within the strategic action field of the Paso del Norte, and considering the incumbentchallenger model proposed by Fligstein and McAdam (2012), Table 5.2 offers a typology of
actors according to the information provided by interviewees. The interviewees in the business
sector and local government positions were identified to be actors who are often challengers
within the system and governance units that represent incumbent views and interests, under a
system that prioritizes a security agenda. Governance units are identified as the agencies that
operate under a federal level (i.e. Homeland Security). Incumbents constituted as actors located
in the nations’ capitals, Washington D.C and Mexico City. These incumbents often have greater
policymaking abilities and influence or control the budget of governance units that operate in
distant fields. However, there also seems to be a mixed picture of actors who are also
challengers, as this research includes an actor who occupies a role of challenger, incumbent, and
governance unit.
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Table 5.2 Typology According to the Theory of Strategic Action Fields
Stakeholders
Business/Economic Sector

Typology
Challengers

Local Government Actors

Challengers

Federal Government Agencies

MIX –challenger and incumbent

Federal Actors in Nation’s Capitals

MIX- challenger and incumbent

While our analysis points that challengers’ understand why the rules and system the way it is,
they also wish for a better understanding of their geographical region which emphasizes the
interrelation and interdependence of both cities. The shared understandings of the field and
actors point to a historical institutionalization of the system set by state actors who control the
boundaries of both countries. The analysis focused on the narratives of cross-border
stakeholders, and Chapter Two provides a historical approach to the understandings forged over
various historical and economic forces; leading to hypothesis one to be supported. Incumbents
are more likely to have historically shaped understandings that influence the field. That does not
mean shared understandings will not change with future events, crises, individuals, and
opportunities. However, for now, it seems challengers in the Paso del Norte are left to adapt and
react, often by working around or within the system to gain a better advantage.
Furthermore, crises at times offer opportunities to create alliances and work with
incumbents or governance units. It opens the field to discussion, and it is up to challengersincumbents to perceive threats, opportunities, and actions. In crises like terrorist attacks in
Washington D.C and New York, incumbents perhaps perceived the event as recourse to reinforce
a security apparatus and to justify budgets and resources towards protecting the homeland. This
event left challengers in the Paso del Norte region in the position to work in, within and around
such a power and interest structure. Business voices reacted and adapted to such changes. Also,
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there are times where opportunities arise, giving challengers a chance to improve the power
structure. Hypothesis two holds that challengers are more likely to forge coalitions to increase
cooperation and opportunities. This research supports this hypothesis, as challengers discourse
points to their willingness to work with other actors to benefit the region. For example, our
analysis offered the example of challengers working with governance units that operate at the
border. Highlighted were private-public partnerships, like the Secure Electronic Network for
Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) Dedicated Commuter Lanes (DCL) that allows for a faster
system of crossing. However, it is important to acknowledge the downside to the DCL, which is
the price individuals have to pay in order to be accepted in the programs. Moreover, challengers
will also work within the security dominated system, and participate in programs like the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) by the U.S Customs and Border
Protection (CBP). The program is a voluntary public-private sector partnership that offers traderelated businesses an opportunity to “play an active role in the war against terrorism,” thereby
ensuring a rapid and more secure supply chain for the company, suppliers and customers (CBP
2014). Ana Hinojosa (El Paso Inc. 2011), Director of Field Operations for Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) in El Paso (who now works in D.C) comments that the agency works on a
concept called traffic segmentation, which promotes programs like SENTRI and Free and Secure
Trade (FAST) program. Additionally, technological advances (i.e- x-rays, gamma rays) have
aided in creating a faster system for trade and commerce crossing the border. Even though
governance units at times work with or alongside challengers, hypothesis three is supported, as
governance units are found to be actors that enforce incumbents’ views and interest while
overseeing the management of the field. Governance unit actors that were interviewed
acknowledged that the way they operated changed after certain crises, such as September 11,
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2001. However, it is important to note that while incumbent actors were difficult to interview,
governance units provided an account of their interests and views, thus creating some category
blurring between incumbent and governance units.
However, it can also be seen that in different crises, such as Mexico’s war against drug
trafficking, actors perceived threats and the instability of the field, and some worked together
during such crises to improve the field. The interests of the nation’s capitals bears imprint in the
decisions to work together, as the federal level acknowledged a ‘shared responsibility’ in the war
against drug trafficking, as the United States is one of the largest drug consumers in the world.
Furthermore, there are instances that business partners helped each other out during the violence
to lessen the uncertainty of the field. For example, the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce in El
Paso counseled more than 500 businesses on how to open businesses in El Paso. Hypothesis four
was thus supported as this research shows that different types of exogenous shocks and crises
allow actors opportunities to determine, change or transform rules in a particular field. However,
while there are many instances of actors working together, the analysis also addressed that some
crises have the capability of exposing resentment and loyalty questioning from actors. An
example discussed was when El Paso changed their visitors’ maps to exclude Ciudad Juárez in
2010, a year that marked the height of violence in the city.
In the Paso del Norte region, it is evident that identity plays a large role in the work and
lives of actors, and as such hypothesis five is supported. Many actors in the Paso del Norte
region would like to be seen as one community, one region, in order to improve their
competitiveness and highlight their interdependence. Many identified as fronterizos
(borderlanders) and were bilingual and bicultural. That identity, the feeling of closeness within a
community perhaps brings them to see or examine the inefficiencies in the region more closely
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as they live, work, and love the nature of the two cities. They often argue that others do not
understand the dynamic of the border, mainly policymakers in the capital cities of Washington
D.C and Mexico City. The way interviewees described the region, interaction, and identity is tied
to Martínez’s (1994a) borderland milieu. However, local challengers find that if they educate
people in the heartland, actors will be able to fathom the interconnectivity of their lives across
the border, leading to comprehensive policies and actions for those in the region. Moreover,
hypothesis six states that socially skilled actors are more likely to form alliances and attempt to
educate incumbents on the field in question. This research found that the social skill of actors
serves as a catalyst to create a cohesive narrative and produce change. While the analysis of
actors shows the cohesive narrative, at least of those who are challengers’ needs more work,
many see some of the leadership in the region as a strong. By offering an example of an
individual, Congressman O’Rourke, it portrays an institutional entrepreneur who is attempting to
create a strong narrative for those challengers in the Paso del Norte region, along with similar
minded border advocates who are also in Congress. O’Rourke also offered an insight as a
challenger who crossed over to a governance unit in order to improve the position of the Paso del
Norte region. His identity is important because as he grew up in the Paso del Norte region, he
sees the region as many interviewees do, and that shared identity leads forefront when
advocating for the region.
Finally, it is important to note that during the analysis of the interviews, the terms
coordination, cooperation, and collaboration frequently were said and used interchangeably. I
focus on instances of cooperation as Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012:15) field theory proposes
cooperation, involving building political coalitions. However, in instances when looking at the
borderland such as the Paso del Norte region, there is more to what the terms suggest. Payan’s
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(2010:230-231) illustrates seven components to each term: objectives, vision, acknowledgement
of interdependence, mechanisms of interaction, purpose of the system, requirements, and
physical location of participants. According to Payan, cooperation entails:
1. Objectives: May or may not be the same; when they are the same, it is purely
coincidental.
2. Vision: Partial coincidence in understandings of self-interest, meaning, and purpose
and joint action is possible in those areas where these intersect.
3. Acknowledgement of interdependence: Medium, actors need to acknowledge that they
need each other to accomplish their goals.
4. Mechanisms of interaction: Designed to maneuver in tandem on a temporary basis in
order to achieve different goals; actors must understand the rules well as they work
together; such synchronization is likely to die after the goals have been accomplished
5. Purpose of the system: To work together to accomplish goals that may or may not
coincide but which cannot be accomplished without each other’s involvement. Action is
linear, along predetermined rules and procedures that are more or less permanent but still
in flux.
6. Requirements: A good deal of trust; ample information sharing, particularly while the
work is ongoing and frequent consultation to clear obstacles to action.
7. Physical location of participants: Regularized meetings but separate location.
While many of Payan’s cooperation components may fit the instances of cooperation
discussed by interviewees’ narratives of the Paso del Norte region, it seems the component that is
largely overlooked is requirements. Trust, information sharing, and consultation should be on the
forefront of discussions, particularly with issues of security, because they involve a geographic
area where two states interact. If there is a real output to recognize the foundation of problems,
then there can be a closer attempt to move past those issues in times of crises, ultimately
benefiting those in need. However, it is best to say that while the Paso del Norte region is closer
to cooperation than collaboration (see Payan 2010 collaboration terminology) it does not mean
that there are not components of coordination and collaboration within the Paso del Norte field in
a particular instance. Yet identifying where components are lacking is vital in order to improve
the quality of the field in question.
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Thus, the meso-level examination of cross-border governance using stakeholder
narratives in business and political/security sector and analyzed using the theoretical framework
of Fligstein and McAdam (2012), Martinez (1994a) and Payan (2010) has presented a glimpse of
the intricate and complicated nature of the Paso del Norte field. The next and last chapter of this
thesis will provide a brief discussion of the results, address the theoretical framework,
methodology and limitations, provide a discussion for future research, and offer policy
recommendations for the U.S.-Mexico border.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions
This chapter seeks to recapitulate the inferences of this thesis, assess the strengths and
weaknesses of the theoretical framework and methodology, address limitations, discuss future
research, and provide policy recommendations.

6.1 SUMMARY OF STUDY AND FINDINGS
This research is part of a larger study that seeks to provide a comparative investigation on
the dynamics of cross-border governance in North America and Europe as “not a static
phenomenon but as a transforming one” (Dupeyron 2012b). This research, however, focuses on
the qualitative field work and narratives of key cross-border governance stakeholders in the Paso
del using economic/business and political/security actors. Furthermore, the research focuses on
key crises and recent events that have changed or transformed the Paso del Norte field, but have
been influenced by many historical factors. Furthermore, in order to understand field dynamics,
three theoretical frameworks were used: Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) theory of fields to
examine actors’ perspectives of power structure, mechanisms, and insights on the dynamics of
security governance, Oscar Martínez’s (1994a) borderland milieu, and Payan’s (2010) typology
of the terms coordination, cooperation and collaboration.
The identification of five categories used in the analysis consisted of using the three
theoretical frameworks listed above. The five identified categories were- shared understandings,
borderland identity, crises and field stability, innovative action and cooperation, and socially
skilled actors. The first category, shared understandings, sought to identify the understandings in
the Paso del Norte field, who has power and why, and what are the rules of legitimate action in
the field. The analysis found that interviewees recognize and understand the security
implications that have affected the border, but share no consensus about how a centralized
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security apparatus works best within the dynamics of interaction a cross-border community like
the Paso del Norte region. Interviewees cited long lines at the bridges, additional inspections, and
U.S. Department of State alerts that at times deter people from crossing to the other city, likely
hurting consumers and business providers. Moreover, the analysis provided an account from the
interviewees on who governs the Paso del Norte field. Most of our interviewees were identified
to be local challengers and governance units. Thus, interviewees in this thesis identified
incumbents as federal policy makers in both nations’ capitals, Washington D.C and Mexico City.
However, interviewing actors cited as incumbents is a difficult challenge, due to various factors
such as availability to interview and geographical proximity. However, governance units bear the
imprint of incumbents’ interests and views, thus giving this research an insight on the
incumbents’ perspective, but created some category blurring between incumbents and
governance units. The analysis found that governance units abide and enforce incumbent
interests, but given their geographic proximity and interaction to regional actors, their view on
the field at times may acknowledge or advocate for the needs and obstacles challengers face in
their field. Some interviewees noted alliances with governance units through public-private
partnerships and interaction to allow actors in the field an opportunity to work together. Yet
others commented how governance units and incumbents did not understand the dynamics of the
region, including the interdependent relationship between the two cities.
Moreover, the second category analyzed the perspective of identity. Many interviewees
referred to themselves as fronterizos (borderlanders), identifying with both cities and shared
culture of El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez. Their identity is likely to be a factor that connects
challengers in mounting a defense to those who do not understand the region. Furthermore, it is
socially skilled actors, who aid in appealing and help incite cooperative acts from actors. Identity
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may also play a role as a strategic advantage to create a cohesive narrative to surmount a
challenge. Moreover, interviewees cited that awareness and education on the dynamics and
interdependence may provide actors with a better understanding of the region.
Furthermore, in times of crises, identity may play a role as policies and different interests
clash at the Paso del Norte field. Interviewees also allowed a perspective on the third and fourth
categories, crises and field stability and innovative action and cooperation. Interviewees cited
several crises that affected the field, among them being 9/11, economic crises, and Mexico’s war
on narco-trafficking. However, it is also important to note the impact of crises that occurred
outside the Paso del Norte field. The terrorist attacks of September 11th in New York and
Washington D.C was a crisis that did not occur near the Paso del Norte field, but the field was
highly affected as a result of national security interests that began to dominate action and
discourse. However, Fligstein and McAdam (2012:22) argue all that actors have a stake in
restoring order, even those who might benefit from a prolonged crisis. The crises analyzed in this
thesis provided an illustration of how actors interacted and engaged in innovative action. Finally,
the fifth category, socially skilled actors analyzed the challenger discourse in the in-depth
interviews and highlighted an example of a socially skilled actor within the Paso del Norte field.
Congressman Beto O’Rourke provided an interesting case because he possesses the
characteristics of institutional entrepreneur, challenger and governance unit in an incumbent
position. This leads to a better understanding of the social skills that individuals possess and
tactics they take to gain a better position in a field.

6.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theory of fields proposed by Fligstein and McAdam (2012) was used as the central
theoretical lens to examine and analyze the dynamics of change and stability and the role and
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power structure actors have in a given field. The authors contend the field framework can be
applied in different settings and disciplines, given the researcher accounts for field-specific
contexts. However, in retrospect, the theory fell short in accounting for a field such as the U.SMexico border, where fields overlap between state actors over a specified geographic territory.
Indeed, the authors attempt to account for the impact of state fields (Fligstein and McAdam
2012:71-77) and address the problem of the state in relation to strategic action fields (173-174).
However, the complexities that surround the U.S.-Mexico border needs a closer examination,
such as when one state is more powerful than the other and how that affects the field, other
actors, crises and response. Nonetheless, field theory also provided a unique insight on the
existential functions of the social and social skills. Research remains understudied on the kinds
of processes, tactics and skills actors possess in order to gain advantages in a particular field, and
this research provides an example of discourse and actions taken by actors. Thus, two additional
theories, borderland milieu by Martínez (1994) and border typology by Payan (2010) were
incorporated to complement the field theory and better assess the Paso del Norte region.
Martínez’s borderland milieu facilitated the identification of processes and contributors to how
borderlanders view themselves and how they are perceived by interior zones. Moreover,
Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) field theory also falls short in elaborating the term cooperation.
Payan (2010) argues that the terms coordination, cooperation and collaboration are used
interchangeably, but differ in the structure and processes. Payan proposes seven components: 1)
objectives, 2) vision, 3) acknowledgement of interdependence, 4) mechanisms of interaction, 5)
purpose of the system, 6) requirements, and 7) physical location of participants. These seven
components provided a deeper examination of actions and interests in the Paso del Norte field.

76

6.3 METHODOLOGY
This research used a combination of semi-structured interviews, text analyses of scholarly
and government documents and publications, participant observation in conferences,
presentations and events. The interview guide (See Appendix A) used followed a semi-structured
format, allowing for an interviewee to speak freely on the topic. The guide consisted of 61
questions and 8 sections- personal information, border experience/exposure, current professional
position, organization/institution/business and its border network, ways to give those challenges
and obstacles a resolution, beyond the border, cross-border sociability, and reflections and
recommendations. While the research team kept the theoretical framework in mind when
creating the interview guide, the one section where it lacks questions is on identity. While some
interviewees ended up sharing their own views on their identity, the interview guide only askshow do you define yourself (Question 4), thus limiting the analysis on identity within the Paso
del Norte region.

6.4 LIMITATIONS
This research brings to light several methodological and research limitations that need to
be addressed, as they may have an impact on findings in this research. First, this research used a
sample size of 34 individuals, which limits generalizability. Also, due to the time limit of
graduate research, longitudinal effects prevented the researcher from analyzing the 71 interviews
of the Paso del Norte region. Moreover, the individuals selected to participate in the study were
identified for their knowledge and work involving cross-border governance, but access to
incumbent actors (in Washington D.C and Mexico City) was a major limitation, because the
researcher had to rely on historical accounts, secondary sources, and governance units to address
their interests and position. Furthermore, as Fligstein and McAdam (2012:75) explain the state is
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a set of strategic action field, and the interviewees in this research would generalize the
government as a unified actor, identifying those incumbents as federal/central state actors.
Therefore in order to gain better understanding of state role in field theory, research must find a
way to break down the system within states in relation to the border and governance.
Another limitation could be the measurements used to collect the data. The interview
guide, which consisted of 61 questions, was used by the researchers, but at times due to the
participants’ time limits and schedule, there was not enough time to ask all the questions.
Furthermore, as aforementioned, the University of Texas at El Paso has certain procedures in
order to conduct research in other countries (especially when they have a U.S Department of
State travel alert); therefore the interviews in Mexico were done by colleagues from the
Autonomous University of Ciudad Juárez, and could potentially be a limitation, since I could not
attend the interviews and ask my own questions. Finally, in order for truly comprehensive
analysis in field theory, one should be informed of what types of resources are available for
actors and how they use them. Unfortunately in the area of security and business, these resources
are at times not available to the public.

6.5 FUTURE RESEARCH
The research explored in this thesis contributes to the advancement and discussion of
cross-border governance in the Paso del Norte region and field theory. While this thesis focuses
only on political and economic-business actors in the Paso del Norte region, it provides a stride
to research in border governance field theory, a topic that has been understudied but has room for
vast research. This research provides a deeper examination of the ‘shared understandings’ that
the Paso del Norte holds with incumbent actors in nation’s capitals, shared understandings
through identity shared by challengers, the alliances between governance units and local
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challengers, and a discussion of challenger discourse and social skills using identity. Fligstein
and McAdam’s (2012:117) argue that defining with “some degree of conceptual and empirical
precision” the contours of a strategic action field is a complex challenge. As is the case with the
Paso del Norte region, the boundary alone intersecting with two state actors, embedded in two
sets of strategic action field systems. Furthermore, Fligstein and McAdam (2012:92) also argue
that even in the most stable of fields, a “settlement must always be regarded as a work in
progress”. While these findings contain room for further exploration, they nonetheless are a step
in understanding the dynamics of border governance.
Furthermore, it is evident that further research is needed in order to better assess the role
of actors, their social skills, crises that undermine field stability, episodes of contention, and
settlement in the Paso del Norte region. Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) theory of fields provides
researchers with a general theory that can be applied in various disciplines and sectors. As the
international project continues, this research may aid in the comparison of cross-border regions
in North America and Europe to be able to better understand the dynamics field emergence,
crises and instability, institutionalization, and the interaction of actors, challengers, incumbents,
and governance units in a field. Moreover, as aforementioned, perhaps one of the biggest gaps in
Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) field theory is the missing component of voiceless challengers.
It is clear more research is necessary to understanding the role of voiceless actors, how they can
challenge the system or who advocates for them.
Additionally, because this research only focuses on three crises because they were the
most mentioned by interviewees, there needs to be greater insight to the historical culmination of
events that led to the security apparatus. There is also room for research when it comes to state
actors, their dominance and legitimacy at the borderline, their interaction in other state fields,

79

and bureaucratic and governance unit assistance, as the state is a complicated set of strategic
action fields. Additionally, there is much research in analyzing the terminology proposed by
Payan (2010) that could assess the level of cross-border instances of coordination, cooperation
and collaboration, under a meso-level examination or a comparative study to other borderlands.

6.6 STABILITY AND CHANGE: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
It is through increased bilateral collaboration and independent domestic progress on key
security issues that true lasting progress in border security will thrive (Lee and Olson 2013). The
Paso del Norte region, through this research, indicates there is room for improvement to be able
to reach a state of cross-border collaboration. Challenger actors have aided in improving
conditions, especially those who possess the strategic social skills necessary to push and
motivate change. It will be important to monitor the progression of relationships across and
within the system, and addressing crises and field instability with the necessary understandings
to create consensual and sustainable field governance for the Paso del Norte region.
When asked about the security and economic clash at the U.S.-Mexico border, a former
governance unit employee says, “for the longest time people thought you could only have one
and you couldn’t have the other, and that’s the complexity… [it] shouldn’t be a sacrifice for one
for the other.” Taking into account the research and analysis in this thesis, and Payan’s (2010)
border typology, the following recommendations are proposed to improve the field:


Mexico and the United States should harmonize objectives and visions oriented to the
shared understandings of trade, human rights, and security beneficial to both countries.



Mexico and the United States should work on improving economic and wage inequality
to ensure economic development for all its citizens and strengthen global
competitiveness.
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Mexico and the United States should recognize the interdependent nature of border
communities and reevaluate their security-dominated policies ensuring that legitimate
trade and travel are efficiently sustained.



Mexico and the United States should consult and address each other when national
policies (i.e. immigration) pertain to another country.



Mexico and the United States should conduct, encourage and increase dialogue and
communication among local and federal actors, fostering norms of continual
consultation.



Mexico and the United States should expand trusted traveler programs (i.e. SENTRI) to
efficiently expedite legitimate crossing and border wait times.



Challengers should launch an educational campaign aimed at policymakers, legislators,
and border stakeholders to inform them on challenges, best practices, and the nature of
border dynamics.



Mexico and United States should encourage and facilitate public-private partnerships
and evaluate the success of partnerships and programs, gathering best practices.

While some of these recommendations may seem challenging, the shared understandings that
pervade in the Paso del Norte field has the potential to transform the ‘rules’ of the game.
Challengers also should collaborate to strengthen socially skilled actors who can represent their
needs and establish a united front and effectively communicate and educate federal actors. Thus,
it is possible to transform the Paso del Norte region to a field where shared understandings and
mechanisms of interaction are clear, consensual and beneficial to all actors.
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Appendix A: Interview Guide
Good morning/afternoon, my/our name(s) is/are _________, I/we will be interviewing you about the
dynamics of cross-border governance. Thank you for giving us this valuable time to research this
phenomenon. We are here to ask you about your experience/vision, work, and background in crossborder governance.
If you have any questions at any point in the interview, please do not hesitate to ask me/us.
I.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
II.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
III.
18.

19.
20.
IV.

Personal information
Birth place
Age
Nationality/Dual Nationality
How do you define yourself: Mexican, American, Mexican-American, etc?
Where did you go to school? (High school, University)
5a.Highest educational attainment
Are you bilingual?
6a.If not, how do you communicate with non-Spanish or non-English speakers?
Where do you reside?
Border Experience/Exposure
Are you originally from the border?
8a.If not, what brought you to do the border area?
8b.If yes, how has your experience with the border changed over time?
How often do you cross the border?
What are the kinds of activities that you carry out when you cross the border? (Shopping,
relationships/family, work/business, contacts, etc.)
How do you cross the border? (Línea Express, walking, biking, etc.)
How much time do you spend on either side of the border?
Do any obstacles prevent you from crossing more often? (Long lines, treatment by law
enforcement agents, etc.)
What are the worst experiences when you cross the border?
What are the best experiences when you cross the border?
What strategies do you use to cross? (i.e.-Time- early crossing, etc.)
What prior experience or involvement, if any, do you have in cross-border cooperation?
Current professional position
What do you do?
18a.How does your job relate to / is affected by the border?
18b.What is your professional contributions to the field?
18c.What did you do before taking this position?
Do you feel you have more ties in the border area because of your work, your education
or for personal reasons? Why?
How do you think your job (past and present) is most impacted by the border?
Organization / Institution / Business and its Border Network
Cross Border Networks
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21. Describe how your organization was created.
22. Tell us about the cross-border work of your institution or organization.
22a. Give us some concrete achievements that your organization has had in relation to
the border.
22b.What challenges or obstacles has your institution faced?
23. What are your Organization / Institution / Business cross-border networks at the local,
regional, cross-border and international levels?
24. What do government entities do in order to facilitate your institution's needs/border
work?
25. What contacts do you have with other public actors especially government?
26. Who are the actors that most interact with each other across the border?
Challenges and Obstacles
27. Are there any specific events/people/phenomena/law/policy that has made the border
better or worse?
28. Has it been or will it be necessary to instil changes within your organization / institution /
business in order to support this involvement in overcoming challenges and obstacles to
border interaction?
29. What are the human, technical and financial resources that are available within your
organization to support its cross-border interaction?
30. What are the major obstacles for political / social / economic-business actors to interact?
31. What are the fundamental values that key governance actors share in your region, which
tie cross-border cooperation together? What makes the border work?
32. What are the main obstacles to cross-border cooperation in the whole region? What is the
impact of cross-border cooperation on your organization?
33. What are the results that would not have been achieved without cooperation?
34. Is there anything you would do differently? Why and how?
V.
How to Give Those Challenges and Obstacles a Resolution
35. In order to deal with border issues, have you participated in meetings, workshops, events,
sessions?
35a.How are these meetings organized and coordinated?
35b.Who facilitated these meetings/workshops/events/sessions?
35c.What was accomplished through these meetings?
35d.Who were the key actors that made things happen in those meetings?
36. Has any law/policy affected or facilitated your work in the past? In the present?
37. How has your Organization / Institution / Business adapted to the border environment?
38. How has your Organization / Institution / Business helped to achieve a resolution to the
border environment?
39. What do you propose in order to facilitate cross-border interaction?
VI.
Beyond the Border
40. Do you have contacts with other cross-border regions in North America? If so, could you
provide a few examples?
41. Do you maintain meaningful relations with those cross-border regions?
42. Has NAFTA had an impact on cross-border cooperation? Please specify.
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42a.If it were to be renegotiated, what would you change?
42b.Would you take away from it? Or would you add to it?
VII. Cross-border Sociability
Values and the Place of the Border
43. What is your vision for the future of the border?
44. What are you doing in your professional and personal life to achieve that vision?
45. What are the obstacles you face in your vision of the border?
46. Who are the people that share your vision of the border?
47. Who do you work with to facilitate your work and vision?
48. Who do you think is a model of cross-border collaboration?
49. Do you read the newspapers/radio/television from the other side?
50. Who are the people you think most influence the way the border is?
51. Who are the most influential people on the border, according to your opinion?
52. Are there organizations that you view as models of cross-border interactions?
53. On the other side, what is (are) the most challenging group(s) of people you have dealt
with? Why?
54. Do you know notable individuals or actors who have encouraged/discouraged crossborder cooperation? If so, please specify.
55. Are there people or organizations you would like to work with?
56. What can the current organizations / institutions / businesses on the border do to facilitate
networking?
VIII. Reflections and recommendations
57. What are the most detrimental factors for cross-border governance?
58. Are there any final thoughts on the border that you would like to share? What is it like,
what it will be like in the future?
59. What are the major actors and factors that will likely facilitate/block efficient and
functional cross-border governance?
60. Who else do you think I should talk to?
61. Is there anything else you want to tell me that I didn’t ask about?
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APPENDIX A CONT.: INTERVIEW GUIDE- SPANISH
Buenas tardes, nosotros somos _______ y deseamos entrevistarlo/a para conocer sobre su
trabajo, experiencia y visión en la relación de su organismo con la frontera. Agradecemos su
disposición y tiempo para participar. Si usted tiene alguna observación o duda durante la
entrevista, por favor no dude en preguntarnos.
I. INFORMACIÓN PERSONAL

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Lugar de nacimiento
Edad
Nacionalidad (oficial)
¿Cómo se define usted: mexicano, americano, México-americano, etc.?
¿A qué escuela asistió? (Preparatoria, Universidad)
30a. Mayor grado académico
6. ¿Es usted bilingüe?
6a. En caso de no serlo, ¿Cómo se comunica con personas que no hablan español/inglés?
7. ¿Dónde reside?

II. EXPERIENCIA/CONTACTO CON LA FRONTERA

8. ¿Es usted originario de esta frontera?
8a. En caso de no serlo, ¿qué le trajo a esta región?
8b. Si es originario, ¿Cómo ha cambiado su experiencia con la frontera a través del
tempo?
9. ¿Qué tan seguido cruza la frontera?
10. ¿Cuáles son el tipo de actividades que realiza cuando cruza la frontera? (compras, trabajo,
negocios, visitar familiares, etc.)
11. ¿Cómo cruza la frontera? (línea exprés, a pie, auto, bicicleta, etc.)
12. ¿Cuánto tiempo permanece en cada lado de la frontera?
13. ¿Existen algunos obstáculos que eviten que usted cruce más seguido la frontera? (filas
largas, actitud de los agentes de migración, etc.)
14. ¿Cuáles han sido las peores experiencias cuando cruza la frontera?
15. ¿Cuáles ha sido las mejores experiencias cuando cruza la frontera?
16. ¿Qué estrategias utiliza para facilitar el cruce? (por ejemplo, cruzar temprano)
17. ¿Cuenta con algún tipo de experiencia previa en temas de cooperación transfronteriza?
III. POSICIÓN PROFESIONAL ACTUAL

18. ¿A qué se dedica?
18a. ¿Cómo se relaciona su trabajo (lo que hace) con la frontera?
18b. ¿Cuál es su aportación profesional a su campo de trabajo?
18c. ¿A qué se dedicaba antes de tener la ocupación actual?
19. ¿Considera que tiene mayores lazos con la frontera por su trabajo, por su educación o por
razones personales? ¿Por qué?
20. ¿Cómo considera usted que su trabajo ha sido/es (pasado y presente) afectado por la
frontera?
IV. ORGANIZACIÓN/INSTITUCIÓN/EMPRESAS Y SUS REDES FRONTERIZAS
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Redes transfronterizas
21. ¿Nos puede comentar cómo se creó su empresa/organización/institución?
22. Puede comentarnos sobre el trabajo transfronterizo de su empresa/compañía/institución.
22a. Nos brindaría ejemplos concretos de los logros que su compañía ha tenido en
relación con la frontera.
22b. ¿Qué obstáculos o retos tuvo que enfrentar su compañía?
23. ¿Cuáles son sus redes, como institución en los niveles local, regional, transfronterizo e
internacional?
24. ¿Qué hacen las instancias gubernamentales para facilitar sus necesidades como un
organismo/institución/empresa en la frontera?
25. ¿Qué relación tiene con otros actores públicos, especialmente gubernamentales?
26. ¿Quiénes son los actores que más relación tienen entre sí en la frontera?
Retos y obstáculos
27. ¿Existe algún evento, persona, fenómeno, ley, política específico que haga mejor o peor
la frontera?
28. ¿Ha sido o será necesario instaurar cambios en su institución con el fin de afrontar los
distintos retos y obstáculos que se encuentran en la interacción fronteriza?
29. ¿Cuáles son los recursos humanos, técnicos y financieros que se en encuentran
disponibles en su organización para apoyar la interacción transfronteriza?
30. ¿Cuáles son los mayores obstáculos de interacción para los actores
políticos/sociales/económicos?
31. ¿Cuáles son los valores fundamentales que los actores claves en el gobierno comparten en
su región? ¿Qué vínculos tiene la cooperación transfronteriza? ¿Qué hace funcionar a la
frontera?
32. ¿Cuáles son los principales obstáculos para la cooperación transfronteriza en toda la
región?
32a. ¿Cuál es el impacto de la cooperación transfronteriza en su organización?
33. ¿Cuáles son los resultados que no se podrían lograr sin cooperación?
34. ¿Qué es lo que le gustaría hacer de diferente manera? ¿Por qué? ¿Cómo?
V. CÓMO DAR SOLUCIÓN A LOS RETOS Y OBSTÁCULOS

35. Con el fin de atender los asuntos/problemas de la frontera, ¿usted ha participado en
reuniones, talleres, eventos o sesiones relacionados con el tema?
35a. ¿Cómo se organizan esas reuniones?
35b. ¿Quién promueve esas reuniones, talleres, eventos, sesiones?
35c. ¿Qué se ha logrado a través de estas reuniones?
35d. ¿Quiénes fueron los actores clave para que sucedan las cosas en esas reuniones?
36. ¿Alguna ley, política ha afectado o facilitado su trabajo en el pasado? ¿En el presente?
37. ¿Cómo se adapta su organización/institución/negocio al contexto fronterizo?
38. ¿Cómo contribuye su organización/institución/negocio a lograr un acuerdo para el
contexto fronterizo?
39. ¿Qué es lo que usted propone para facilitar la interacción transfronteriza?
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VI. MÁS ALLÁ DE LA FRONTERA

40. ¿Tiene usted contactos con otras regiones transfronterizas en Norteamérica? Si es así,
puede darnos algunos ejemplos.
41. ¿Usted mantiene relaciones significativas con esas regiones transfronterizas?
¿Qué tipo de relaciones tiene con esas regiones?
42. ¿El TLC ha tenido un impacto en la cooperación trasfronteriza? Por favor especifique.
42a. Si fuese renegociado (TLC) ¿Qué cambios propondría?
42b. ¿Qué eliminaría? ¿Qué agregaría?
VII. RELACIONES SOCIALES TRASFRONTERIZAS

Valores y lugar de la frontera
43. ¿Cuál es su visión para el futuro de la frontera?
44. ¿Qué acciones realiza en su vida profesional y personal para lograr esa visión?
45. ¿Qué obstáculos enfrenta en su visión de la frontera?
46. ¿Quiénes comparten su perspectiva en la visión de la frontera?
47. ¿Con quién trabaja para facilitar su trabajo y su visión?
48. ¿A quien considera usted un modelo de la cooperación trasfronteriza?
49. ¿Usted lee el periódico/escucha la radio/ ve televisión del otro lado de la frontera?
50. ¿Quiénes son las personas que usted considera más influyen en la forma en como es la
frontera?
51. En su opinión, ¿Quiénes son las personas más influyentes en la frontera?
52. ¿Existen organizaciones que usted considere como modelo de interacción trasfronteriza?
53. Por otra parte, para usted ¿Cuál es el grupo/os de personas con el que ha tratado que han
representado un mayor reto? ¿Por qué?
54. ¿Conoce usted, personas o actores destacados que han alentado u obstruido la
cooperación transfronteriza?, De ser así, por favor especifique.
55. ¿Con que personas u organizaciones le gustaría trabajar en materia de cooperación
transfronteriza?
56. ¿Qué pueden hacer las organizaciones actuales en la frontera para facilitar la creación de
redes?
VIII. REFLEXIONES Y RECOMENDACIONES

57. ¿Cuáles son los factores que más afectan la gobernabilidad trasfronteriza?
58. ¿Existe algunas reflexiones finales sobre la frontera que quisiera compartir? ¿Cómo es o
cómo será en el futuro?
59. ¿Cuáles son los principales actores y factores que facilitan u obstruyen la eficiente y
funcional gobernabilidad trasfronteriza?
60. ¿A quién más considera usted deberíamos entrevistar?
61. ¿Hay algo más que quisiera comentar y que no fue preguntado?
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Appendix B: IRB Approval Letter
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APPENDIX B CONT.: IRB EXTENSION
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Appendix C: Letter of Initial Contact
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Appendix D: Consent Form

100

101

102

103

Appendix E: List of Interviewees and Conference/ Speeches
El Paso Interviews
1. Lydia Nesbitt-Arronte (Borderplex Alliance)
2. Richard Dayoub (President/CEO-El Paso Chamber of Commerce)
3. Javier Alfredo Araujo (Former Borderplex Alliance/ Department of State)
4. Dennis Melonas (Central Business Association)
5. Joe Wardy (Transportation/Trucking industry)
6. Susie Byrd (El Paso City Representative)
7. Sandra Montijo-Dubrule (AMAC)
8. Rebekah Salazar (U.S Border Patrol)
9. Victor Manjarrez (UTEP- Border Security/ Ex-Border Patrol)
10. Beto O’Rourke (U.S Congressman)
11. Joyce Wilson (El Paso City Manager)
12. John Cook (Former Mayor)
13. Dr. Josiah Heyman (UTEP- Endowed Professor of Border Trade Issues)
Juárez Interviews
1. Juan Carlos Talavera Noriega (Desarrollo Económico)
2. Manuel Sotelo (Fletes Sotelo)
3. Fernando Ávila Ortega (FECHAC)
4. Sergio Nevarez (Reparto S.A)
5. Francisco Moreno (Centro de Convenciones)
6. Armando Prado (CANACO)
7. Viridiana Vázquez (CANACINTRA)
8. Demetrio Sotomayor (Turismo de la zona norte)
9. Cristina Cunningham (CANIRAC)
10. Jesús Otero (Century 21)
11. Blanca Duran (Coalición de Transportistas)
12. Jorge Orlando Pérez Gutiérrez (Promoción Financiera)
13. Sergio Meza de Anda (Plan Estratégico Juárez)
El Paso Inc. Q&A (in-depth interviews): Reprinted in the 2011, 2012 and 2013 Book of Lists
1. Ana Hinojosa, Director, El Paso Field Operations U.S Customs and Border Patrol, March
20, 2011.
2. Beto O’Rourke, District 8, City Council, June 19, 2011/May 27, 2012.
3. Rolando Pablos, CEO Borderplex, March 3, 2013
4. J. Antonio Rico, Chair, El Paso Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, January 15, 2012.
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Conferences/Speeches
1. Looking East: European and US-Mexico Border Studies. September 13, 2014. El Paso,
Texas.
-Dr. Oscar Martinez
-David Saucedo
2. Texas– Chihuahua-New Mexico Regional Economic Competitiveness Forum. September
12th, 2014. El Paso, Texas.
-Senator Jose Rodriguez
-Congressman Beto O’Rourke
3. The Rio Grande Economics Association July meeting, Ian G. Brownlee- U.S. Consul
General Consulate General of the United States of America, Ciudad Juarez. July 25,
2014. El Paso, Texas.
4. Beyond NAFTA: Streamlining the Border to Strengthen North American
Competitiveness. May 15, 2014. Bellingham, WA.
-Dr. Tony Payan
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iii
In the web-based survey, however, answers compiled differ slightly from the initial cases: Pyrenees–
Mediterranean Euroregion (France/Spain)/ Aquitaine-Euskadi Euroregion (France / Spain); Galicia / North of
Portugal Euroregion (Spain / Portugal); Adriatic Euroregion (Italy / Slovenia); Alps-Mediterranean Euroregion
(France / Italy).
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